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Summary:
From Partnership to Community: An 11-Point Commitment
In accordance with the mandate conferred by the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs meeting in The Hague on 30 November 2004, EuroMeSCo has 
prepared a thorough assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, with a special emphasis on the political and 
security chapters and relevant issues from the third chapter. The work also contains 
recommendations on the long-term objectives that should inform a transformed 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
The following 11 main conclusions can be drawn from the report prepared by 
EuroMeSCo in fulﬁlment of this request:   
1. Reafﬁrming the Barcelona Principles: The Potential Acquis
The analysis of the Barcelona Declaration (1995) ten years after its proclamation 
shows how modern and relevant a project it remains. The Declaration is underpinned 
by four key ideas: ﬁrst, the primacy of fundamental values; second, the rejection of 
power politics in relations between states; third, a commitment to build a common 
economic area, with the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) in 2010 as an 
indispensable instrument to achieve that goal; and fourth, placing civil society at 
the core of the processes of regional integration, cooperation and reform. At the 
heart of the process is the commitment of the partners ‘to develop the rule of law 
and democracy in their political systems.’ These aspirations are what constitute the 
‘potential acquis’ of the process. It is an acquis because it is a ratiﬁed and formal 
commitment, but potential because the conditions for its full realisation are not yet 
in place. Implicit in this commitment is a notion of joint political responsibility for the 
implementation of commonly deﬁned objectives. In short, the Barcelona process 
thus aims to create an enormously diverse regional group based on the European 
experience, to promote peace and freedom through inclusion, by creating the 
conditions for the potential acquis to become a really existing acquis.
2. Recognising Current Limitations
An overview of the last ten years shows that reality lags far behind the aims, and that 
the causal and sequential link between economic reform and political liberalisation 
has failed to materialise. If there has been any progress in human development terms, 
it has been neither uniform nor sufﬁcient to respond to the grave social problems 
of the region. Economic reforms have largely failed to encourage political reform. 
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The Partnership failed to address seriously political issues, not only in the realm of 
security but also as regards human rights, not least because of the assumption 
of a causal sequential link to economic reform. At the same time, South-South 
cooperation is only now taking incipient steps forward with the Agadir Process, 
and sub-regional cooperation in the Mahgrib and the Middle East has remained 
hostage to unresolved tensions and conﬂicts that the Partnership has been unable 
to address. In short, the 2010 project that underpins the whole process is at risk.
3. Choosing Between Reform and Irrelevance
North and South, the view among the general public is that the EMP has not met 
expectations and needs and, what is particularly serious, that it has actually served 
to bolster the status quo. At the same time there is widespread acknowledgement 
that there is no viable alternative, and that the incremental and long-term approach to 
reform adopted by the EMP is actually the most appropriate, a view reinforced after 
11 September, the war in Iraq, and various regional reform initiatives, including the G8 
initiative for the Middle East, and various exclusively European policies such as the 
Neighbourhood Policy, which offers a bilateral solution to the problems of the region. In 
this context, if the multilateral EMP fails to respond effectively to the challenges, it could 
lose relevance, and become progressively sidelined, losing support and legitimacy. In 
short, the EMP thus faces a very clear choice: reform and revival, or paralysis.
4. Identifying Good Practices
Reviving the EMP means using the building blocks of good practices in all the areas 
covered by the Partnership, and the progressive appropriation of the process by actors 
other than those in state bureaucracies, including migrant communities, entrepreneurs 
and the growing number of civil society organisations that have worked in the education 
or human rights ﬁelds. The socialisation of the Partners through joint work in common 
institutions, independently of bilateral tensions, within which each is autonomous and equal, 
is one of the main examples of good practice. Socialisation through institutionalisation 
and routinisation of contacts is a central aspect of the real acquis of the Process. In 
short, the real acquis of the EMP already provides a solid basis upon which to build the 
instruments and mechanisms to turn the potential acquis into a reality.
5. Taking Advantage of the New International Commitment to Political Reform
The current international situation, particularly the evolution of US foreign policy 
towards the region, have had a contradictory impact on the Mediterranean. On 
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the one hand, US initiatives placed political reform squarely on the international 
agenda, on the other, the war in Iraq generated great hostility towards ‘democratic 
interventionism’. At the same time, Southern states and civil societies are debating 
and engaging with reform agendas as never before. This duality – a desire for reform 
but a resistance to external imposition – means that the EMP is in a unique position to 
further develop its speciﬁc approach to supporting reforms that is case-sensitive and 
modulated. In short, the EMP offers a unique path to promote democratisation that 
embraces both what is universal and speciﬁc on the basis of a common endeavour 
framed by shared values. In short, in light of the new international context, this is the 
time to afﬁrm its speciﬁcity.
6. Promoting the Notion of a Euro-Mediterranean Community
of Democratic States
The potential acquis of the EMP is about creating an area founded upon the pillars 
of democracy and the elimination of the use of force among neighbours. In other 
words, all states accept this aim even though they are at present unable to meet all 
the requisites of rule of law based democracy. 2005 is the moment for the EMP to 
reafﬁrm unequivocally that acquis, and to make clear that its logical outcome must 
be the creation of a regional group based on a democratic convergence among 
participating states. In short, the EMP can only be reinvigorated and maintain its 
relevance into the future if it turns its potential acquis into speciﬁc actions designed 
to create a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States.
7. Integrating the Aims of the Neighbourhood Policy into the EMP
The Neighbourhood Policy makes the aims of the EMP clearer, as it has introduced 
speciﬁc and detailed programmes to strengthen national rule of law, democracy and 
basic rights commitments. At the same time, the EU is now offering its Southern 
neighbours a stake in the Single Market and its Four Freedoms. If the EMP fails to 
make these aims part of the process – if it does not work towards the constitution of 
a Euro-Mediterranean Community between democratic states, the bilateral nature 
of the Neighbourhood Policy will gradually destroy the regionally focused EMP. The 
solution to the potential divergence between the EMP and the Neighbourhood 
Policy is to establish different objectives for Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean 
neighbours: for the former the end goal is the Euro-Mediterranean Community of 
Democratic States. In short, a strong EMP is an EMP that reinforces its regional and 
multilateral nature, while taking on board the normative commitments of the bilateral 
Neighbourhood Policy as the way to create a Euro-Mediterranean Community of 
Democratic States.
Barcelona Plus
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8. Building the Five Pillars
A Euro-Mediterranean Community must be built around ﬁve pillars. 
The ﬁrst and central pillar is democracy, which means actively promoting political 
reform and involving in the process civil society and all groups – Islamic ones 
included – which reject political violence.
The second pillar is inclusion in diversity, which means abandoning the dialogue 
of civilization approach that establishes a bipolar religious divide that does not 
correspond to reality, and adopting the notion of ‘hospitality’ towards an ‘other’ that 
is not intrinsically different but rather intrinsically similar or equal. 
The third pillar is migration, which cannot be addressed from a security perspective, 
but rather in a way that makes migrants and their descendants central actors in the 
process of regional political and economic integration. 
The fourth pillar is citizen security. Because civilians are the preferred targets of 
violence in the Mediterranean, protecting them with policies based on a close 
linkage between security and justice, and the reinforcement of the rule of law, is a 
precondition for long-term legitimacy, credibility and, ultimately, success.
The ﬁfth pillar is social solidarity and cohesion. The FTA cannot be achieved at the 
expense of aggravated social disparities and, as in the case of Europe, free trade 
must be accompanied by funds that mitigate the social costs of adjustment, namely 
by promoting education, training, administrative modernisation, the development of 
basic infrastructures, and the promotion of competitiveness and innovation. 
In short, the EU must match the ambitions it has expressed with funds that are sufﬁcient to 
begin building a socially cohesive Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States. 
9. Meeting the 2015 Deadline
The Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States project has to be based 
on the ‘ﬁxed dates’ model that made the single market and currency possible 
in Europe. Hence, the 2010 FTA objective must be prioritised to ensure that the 
Euro-Mediterranean Community and Common Market are achieved by 2015. To 
ensure that the 2015 deadline is met, there must be regular monitoring of progress 
with clearer indicators and benchmarks, as well as a detailed annual review by the 
Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference. This will allow for an assessment of the 
evolution of mutually agreed goals that allow each country to advance towards 
the more complex objective of the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic 
States. Clear indications of what Southern partners will gain by engaging in reforms 
Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States
11
are vital: a stake in the Single Market and its four freedoms, including the free 
circulation of people. In short, establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Community of 
Democratic States means rigour in meeting commonly agreed benchmarks.
10. Ensuring Co-Responsibility and Ownership
This kind of project only works if all parties involved jointly manage it. This means 
dealing with institutional asymmetry, a problem that can be immediately addressed 
by setting up programmes that integrate Southern representatives into a PRO-MED 
UNIT that works alongside the Commission and the Council, particularly for the 
sector speciﬁc domains of the Partnership. A co-presidential system – of which the 
report identiﬁes a number of variations – will promote a more equitable and better-
monitored process. Civil society must play a reinforced role, although Northern and 
Southern ofﬁcials must also engage in a dialogue that explicitly takes the diversity of 
forces on board independently of religion or culture. In short, co-responsibility and 
co-ownership is the only formula for a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic 
states, representation and administrative mechanisms must be reformed to reﬂect 
that, and all peaceful  political and social forces must be engaged.
11. Conquering Elites and Public Opinion with a Visibility Strategy
One of the major difﬁculties faced by the EMP is the lack of information and 
debate in all forums about its nature both North and South, given the absence 
of a communications and dissemination strategy and the limited scope of EMP 
initiatives. Making the Partnership more visible means, ﬁrst and foremost, ensuring 
that its agenda addresses the real concerns and needs of the people of the Euro-
Mediterranean, and involving the public more directly in the activities of the EMP. 
Increased visibility  should be based on four policies: creating an effective visibility 
and communications strategy; make better use of EMP-related networks (‘network 
of networks’); ‘brand’ Barcelona initiatives as an integral part of the Partnership; 
mitigating bureaucratisation by engaging a larger number of government and 
administration sectors. In short, the EMP can only conquer hearts and minds and 
become an Euro-Mediterranean Community if its aims are widely disseminated, 
democratically debated, and efﬁciently implemented.
The Barcelona Plus Declaration
November 2005 is the moment for the states that are party to the EMP to afﬁrm this 
11-point commitment. This is the only way to ensure that the EMP does not wither, 
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but rather ﬂourishes as a path towards the constitution of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Community of Democratic States through the conscious transformation of its 
potential acquis into a real experience that is felt by the peoples living within its 
borders. In short, when celebrating its 10th anniversary and returning to Barcelona in 
2005, the EMP must re-afﬁrm the principles of the Barcelona Declaration and make 
explicit the goal of building a Euro-Mediterranean Community that refuses power 
politics in mutual relations.
Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States
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Aim and Scope of the Report
The aim of this report is to assess the achievements and the shortcomings of the 
Barcelona Process, ten years after its inauguration, against the goals originally 
set forth with a view to proposing a future design for the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. Thus, the report re-examines the founding principles and values of 
the Barcelona Process, and the explicit and implicit objectives of the signatories of 
the Barcelona Declaration in a forward-looking way. The original vision enunciated 
by the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean zone of 
peace, democracy and human development –in short, the full promotion of human 
dignity across this vast area–, has yet to be fully implemented, but must also be 
adjusted and enhanced to enable the EMP to meet present challenges and adapt 
to a changed regional and international environment. 
This report, in accordance with the mandate conferred on EuroMeSCo by the Hague 
Ministerial, is concerned solely with the ﬁrst chapter and closely related issues in the 
third chapter, and concentrates on the long-term objectives that should inform a 
transformed Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It proposes therefore that priorities 
should henceforth be deﬁned with a view to generating a new impetus, including 
in what concerns core objectives of the Barcelona Process. In this light, the 2010 
deadline established in 1995 for the ‘multilateralisation’ of a free trade area that to 
a large extent exists already at the EU-individual Southern Mediterranean partners 
level must therefore be met, even as the Partnership seeks to identify the priorities 
for a new era in Euro-Mediterranean relations. This is vital to attain the long-term 
goal of South-South integration. It should be noted that Turkey, given its candidate-
member status, is considered, for the purpose of this report, as part of the EU 
integration process and not as a Southern partner. 
Proposing a reform of the Barcelona Process clearly calls for a consideration of the 
speciﬁc current political, social and economic context in each individual member 
state, and that the sub-regional dimension be equally given due consideration. It 
also calls for a consideration of the sustainability and desirable evolution of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership in a context of ongoing and persistent crises and conﬂicts 
that continue to cause terrible suffering and appalling loss of life and constitute a 
massive obstacle to the creation of a real community of states and peoples. Equally, 
the strain of events on the periphery of the region covered by the Partnership cannot 
be overlooked, including the situation in Iraq and its overspill. On the other hand, 
US-inspired initiatives towards the Mediterranean (similar to the EMP in that they 
rely on the use of ‘soft power’), which have partly been incorporated into the G8 
framework, must also be factored in.
Developments in Europe will also affect the Partnership and its future shape. Notably, 
the new EU institutional design and policy emphasis arising from the Constitutional 
Treaty is likely to generate a more coherent approach towards the EMP. Internal 
Barcelona Plus
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changes in EU governance, notably the enhancement of the Community method, 
together with the prominence given to the notion of neighbourhood and the methods 
devised to make it come about, are bound to have a cumulative effect on reshaping 
the Barcelona Process.
The report reﬂects an attempt to provide answers to a number of speciﬁc questions 
identiﬁed as crucial to the future outlook of the Partnership. 
First, what is the link between economic development and democratic reform? 
Second, how can the EMP contribute to guarantee citizens’ security, and reinforce 
respect for human rights and the rule of law? 
Third, how can the Neighbourhood Policy contribute to giving renewed impetus to 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? 
Fourth, how can sub-regional cooperation in the Maghrib and the Middle East be 
promoted?
Fifth, how can co-ownership of the Barcelona Process be ensured?
Sixth, what role should migrants from the Southern states in the EU have in the 
EMP? 
Seventh, how can the role of civil society and political actors in furthering the 
Barcelona goals be enhanced?
The report takes a hard look at the extent to which the Partnership has met – or 
failed to meet – original expectations. It includes a detailed assessment of what the 
process has achieved thus far, and to what extent its original goals have produced 
tangible results. It should be noted at this point that this is no easy task for a number 
of reasons: ﬁrst, inclusion is a process designed to produce results over the long 
haul. Second, the absence of reliable indicators and EMP evaluation mechanisms 
makes it difﬁcult to assess the political aspects of the Partnership, including the 
political implications of the economic chapter. Finally, although there are readily 
available general indicators on governance and general development trends, it is not 
easy to establish with any degree of certainty a causal link between such indicators 
and the EMP. In light of these limitations, the methodology adopted in this report 
is to compare reality with goals, and try to establish to what extent policies and 
institutions measure up to the original goals of the Partnership.
Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States
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I. Back to Basics:
The Barcelona Declaration Revisited
The point of departure for any EMP reform is the Barcelona Declaration itself. The 
vision it embodies has become even more relevant today, when public demands for 
reform and democracy are rising. Not unlike other integration initiatives such as the 
Mercosur, the Southern Common Market in Latin America, the Barcelona Process 
was born out of speciﬁc circumstances in the 1990s, and the overwhelming feeling 
that multilateral governance and regionalism were essential components of a 
post-Cold War international order. They provided the best approach to conﬁdence 
building and conﬂict avoidance between neighbouring countries, and to face the 
multifaceted challenges of globalisation. This was termed the ‘new multilateralism’, 
and one of its key deﬁning features was the recognition of the role of civil societies 
in multilateral forums and issues. One of the most innovative aspects of the 1995 
Barcelona Declaration is the important role assigned to civil societies in the general 
promotion of Euro-Mediterranean relations, and the furtherance of the goals of the 
Partnership in particular.
The Nature of the Barcelona Process
It is only in the most formal sense that the Barcelona Process, with its three chapters 
on political and security issues, economic and ﬁnancial cooperation, and social, 
cultural and human affairs, is modelled on the Helsinki Process set in motion by the 
1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). An attempt at 
adding a CSCE-type dimension to the EMP, in the form of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Charter for Peace and Stability, has failed. The commonly offered reason why 
the laboriously negotiated Charter failed to be adopted in 2000 is the worsening 
of the crisis in the Middle East. The fact remains, however, that it was perhaps 
inappropriate, in the context of the three-pronged, holistic Barcelona Process, 
to attempt to separate ﬁrst-chapter issues – political and security cooperation, 
including hard-security issues –, from socio-economic integration. 
The Barcelona Process is much more the successor of European integration, building 
on the experience and the strategy devised for the post-1989 process of eastward 
enlargement, than of the security-driven, bipolar world CSCE. This is not to say that 
speciﬁcally addressing security issues in the Euro-Mediterranean region is beyond the 
reach of the Barcelona Process, nor that attempts at resolving or preventing conﬂict 
and crisis cannot beneﬁt from the CSCE-OSCE experience, as indeed they should, 
particularly in the domain of South-South conﬁdence-building measures. But the 
nature of the Barcelona Process is altogether different from that of Helsinki, primarily 
aimed at defusing bipolar military rivalry, and so are its scope and its ambition.
One of the most 
innovative aspects of 
the 1995 Barcelona 
Declaration is the 
important role assigned 
to civil societies in the 
general promotion of 
Euro-Mediterranean 
relations.
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The Barcelona Declaration states the aim of establishing a free trade area by 2010, 
and sets the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean regional group as a central goal of 
the Partnership. In this and other respects, the EMP is somewhat similar to the 
1994 North American Free Trade Agreement, although more comprehensive and 
politically ambitious, because trade liberalisation is accompanied by political and 
security, social and cultural cooperation mechanisms and thus touches upon virtually 
all aspects of inter-state relations. In 2010, the Barcelona Process is therefore 
expected to have generated an advanced project of open regionalism aimed at 
ensuring a successful response to the challenges posed and opportunities offered 
by globalisation, integrating Maghrib and Mashriq countries with the EU.
Formally, the EMP operates at two, complementary, levels: the bilateral level 
consisting of EU relations with individual Southern partners, governed by the 
respective association agreements; and the regional, predominantly multilateral 
level. All the nine association agreements are now in force barring the agreements 
with Algeria, awaiting ratiﬁcation, and Syria, awaiting signature. The regional agenda 
– hailed as one of the most innovative aspects of the Barcelona Process – although 
it has recognisably set the framework for an enhancement of the bilateral sphere, 
has progressed at a much slower pace, in part because of the conﬂict in the Middle 
East and other regional disputes. 
The EMP is essentially an attempt to extend Southward the zone of peace and 
prosperity achieved within the EU, through a process of North-South, but particularly 
South-South, integration, and thereby move beyond mutual suspicion towards 
association. The letter and spirit of the Barcelona Declaration is that free trade is a 
means to an end: it is a way to attain the long-term goal of Mediterranean peace, 
something Europe has achieved through integration. In Europe, democratic inclusion 
– involving economic integration and reinforced social cohesion in a context of 
political freedom, security and justice – has woven a web of interdependence, and 
reduced the potential for conﬂict, promoting peace and security through economic 
integration focusing on human development. 
The EMP is a long-term, open-ended process, in which success depends upon ongoing 
reform efforts, and on the case-sensitive and modulated EU approach to the issue of 
democratisation that embraces both the universal and the speciﬁc in the development 
of a common endeavour and shared values. The case-sensitive EMP approach towards 
conditionality eschews the strong conditions imposed on EU accession candidates. 
This approach is therefore seen to reject a coercive, security-based and strategically 
informed ideology, although there is the feeling that a more demanding and energetic 
Euro-Mediterranean approach to democratisation is necessary. 
Given its cooperative integrating nature, democratic inclusion requires and 
simultaneously generates a security culture based on an explicit rejection of power 
politics in inter-state relations. The pursuit of national interests at the expense of the 
The Barcelona Process is 
much more the successor 
of European integration, 
building on the experience 
and the strategy devised 
for the post-1989 process 
of eastward enlargement, 
than of the security-
driven, bipolar world 
CSCE.
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security of others is no longer legitimate. Rather, inter-state differences are resolved 
through jointly established norms: it is a juridical concept of security. Economic 
integration, political convergence and security cooperation turn conﬂict into a lose-
lose situation, as these processes heighten popular awareness of the existence of 
shared interests and of a common destiny.
The Principles of the Barcelona Declaration
The Barcelona Declaration signals a commitment to the principles and values 
of peace, stability and prosperity in a context of regional security, diversity and 
pluralism, non-discrimination, respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights 
and liberties, solidarity and equality amongst partners and respect for the values 
and speciﬁc nature of each partner. It is about bringing peoples together through 
regional cooperation, partnership and dialogue. The parties stated a commitment ‘to 
develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems’ in the Declaration, 
and stressed the importance of adequate human rights education.
In order to evaluate the Barcelona Process it is necessary to assess the degree to 
which these principles have been applied within and in relations between the EMP 
countries, and to understand the degree to which state practices live up to the 
Barcelona principles: to what degree does the Barcelona Process promote political 
convergence on fundamental rights? An answer to this question is vital if a future 
reform agenda is to be established. The democratic and integrating nature of the 
EMP is expressed through these principles. In turn, their realisation depends on the 
Barcelona Process playing a central role in the current regional and international 
context.
Agendas and Implicit Objectives
Apart from the explicit objectives stated in the Barcelona Declaration and the global 
aim of political, economic and social integration, EMP members have various 
implicit political agendas, which do not necessarily correspond to the principles 
enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration. Essentially, many capitals held the view that 
economic development through free trade and ﬁnancial assistance would ultimately 
undermine radical domestic opposition, namely of Islamist denomination. Political 
Islam was perceived as an homogeneous reality and as a major challenge in 1995, 
and its diversity was not recognised. This led to an overemphasis on fundamentalist 
sectors and extremist groups resorting to the use of violence, and to a neglect 
of reformist strands in the movement. The Algerian crisis at the end of 1991 
consolidated this stereotype, which informed the drafters of the Declaration. At the 
time, political Islam and the religious renaissance in the South were perceived by 
Democratic inclusion 
requires and 
simultaneously generates 
a security culture based 
on an explicit rejection
of power politics
in inter-state relations.
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most EU Member states and governmental elites in the South – a product of secular 
Arab nationalist movements – as a unique threat to stability. The other main aspect 
of the Barcelona economic paradigm was the desire on the part of Europe to reduce 
migration ﬂows originating in the South.
Southern Mediterranean governments, by and large, were then seeking to embark 
upon market reform and global economic integration, and searching for new 
opportunities to promote regional peace. This change among Arab governments was 
a product of various factors, including the end of the Cold War, the 1991 Gulf war 
and, most importantly, hopes for peace in the Middle East encouraged by the Oslo 
Accords of 1993. In the Maghrib, the Barcelona Partnership was primarily viewed as 
an opportunity for economic modernisation, increased access to European markets, 
greater European aid for the structural adjustment processes that promised to generate 
considerable social and economic hardship. The political elites realised that integration 
with the European market would threaten key economic sectors. At the same time, 
however, globalisation could not be avoided, and economic integration with Europe was 
perceived as a way to minimise its negative impact. It was also felt that this was the best 
way to isolate radical Islamic currents experiencing rising popularity in the context of 
the social and economic difﬁculties facing most of the Southern Mediterranean states. 
In the Mashriq, although considerations of a similar nature were not absent, concerns 
were more political, particularly for the Palestinian National Authority, which was offered 
the ﬁrst time opportunity to become a full partner with Europe. For the other states of 
the region, the Barcelona Process was seen as a new instrument involving Europe in 
the search for multilateral solutions to regional crises.
The Barcelona Acquis
The term acquis is a product of European integration and EU accession criteria. 
The Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations that bind the 
25 EU member states. Applicant countries must accept it before joining the EU 
and must incorporate it into national legislation and implement it from the moment 
of accession onwards. The Barcelona process also has an acquis. It is a body 
of common rights and obligations, based on the norms and agreements adopted 
with the inauguration of the EMP (including the Association Agreements), which 
are legally binding for current as well as future member states. For EU members 
and candidate countries, the Barcelona acquis is an integral part of the acquis 
communautaire.
The acquis communautaire is essentially legal in nature. In the case of the Barcelona 
Process there are two kinds of acquis: an ‘institutional acquis’ that is based on the 
decisions reached over ten years of multi-level meetings, and a ‘potential acquis.’ 
Future EMP members must also accept the latter, at the core of which are the 
The parties stated a 
commitment ‘to develop 
the rule of law and 
democracy in their 
political systems’.
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principles and values enunciated in the Barcelona Declaration. In short, the Euro-
Mediterranean acquis consists of two elements: recognition of the legitimacy of 
the EMP institutions and procedural rules, and recognition of the existence of a 
potential acquis from which the EMP derives its legitimacy.
Institutional Acquis
The institutional framework of the EMP is a complex, three-layered one. It reﬂects 
the fact that the EU system of governance is applied to non-EU states. The EU 
Presidency chairs the Euro-Med committees, and the Commission acts as the 
guardian of the Barcelona Process on behalf of both EU and non-EU members, 
and as the coordinator of the multilateral and bilateral committees. The existence of 
a dual agenda – multilateral and bilateral – adds to the complexity of the structure, 
and this is likely to be reinforced as progress is made with the implementation of 
Association Agreements.
The Barcelona Declaration established the original institutional acquis, paving the 
way for the establishment of common institutions that are the most visible face of 
the multilateral dimension of the Partnership and the strongest socialisation factor. 
The key institutions are the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the sectoral 
ministerial meetings, the Committee, the Senior Ofﬁcials meetings on political and 
security issues and, more recently, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Anna Lindh 
Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures (the ﬁrst common 
institution of the Barcelona Process that is based in a Southern Mediterranean 
Partner and co-ﬁnanced by all members of the Partnership). The bilateral Association 
Councils, Association Committees and Sub-Committees established to implement 
the Association Agreements are also part of this acquis. Although bilateral, the 
Association Agreements reinforce a sense of common purpose and also contribute 
to the socialisation process.
The Potential Acquis
The Barcelona acquis should not be understood as a set of targets that all aspiring 
member states must fulﬁl before they can join, as is the case in the EU. Indeed, 
it is recognised that some political aims are to be achieved over the long term, 
and existing institutions serve to promote their fulﬁlment, rather than the other way 
around. Nonetheless, the ‘potential acquis’ – reﬂected in the tone, principles and 
aims of the Declaration – has to be accepted by all partners as a goal. It is an acquis 
because it is a ratiﬁed and formal commitment, but potential because the conditions 
for its full realisation are not yet in place. Implicit in this commitment is a notion of 
joint political responsibility for the implementation of commonly deﬁned objectives.
Barcelona Plus
20
The Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans have qualitatively changed the nature of 
EU relations with its neighbours. The Plans are more like the pre-accession strategy 
and call for neighbours to accept and incorporate into national law the Single 
Market acquis. Offering Neighbourhood countries the possibility of integrating with 
the Common Market is a challenge similar to that faced by the EFTA countries when 
joining the European Economic Area. A major difference is that political reform was 
not an issue because all these countries were already consolidated democracies.
Accepting the potential acquis means recognising the principles and values of 
Barcelona as the foundation of the project of integration and of the next stage of the 
process, the constitution of a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States. 
As this is to be achieved over time, it is essential to establish monitoring mechanisms. 
These can operate along the lines of the EU ‘open method of coordination’ that 
applies to various EU policy domains, including the Neighbourhood Policy with its 
benchmark system. Applying the open method in the EMP means a multilateral 
benchmarking system that permits the regular assessment of achievements and 
failures. In this way, the potential acquis becomes a guiding force of the Process, 
and not just a rhetorical ﬂourish.
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II. Assessment and Good Practices
The Report assesses six areas of the Barcelona Process that are central to the 
fulﬁlment of its overall aims:
(1) the political and social impact of economic policies;
(2) democracy and human rights;
(3) the role of civil society;
(4) political and security cooperation;
(5) justice and home affairs;
(6) migration.
Because of its centrality for the fulﬁlment of Barcelona’s objectives and for the 
overcoming of old patterns of confrontation, we have also assessed efforts at 
fostering sub-regional integration. Based on insights taken from EuroMeSCo 
surveys, we have tried to highlight basic features of perceptions and degree of 
awareness of the EMP both in the North and in the South.
Political and Social Impact of Economic Measures
The Partnership has made a positive contribution to Southern modernisation efforts, 
and human development indices have improved, from an average 0,694 in 1995 to 
0,731 in 2004. 
See Table 1.
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Nonetheless, unemployment, social exclusion and illiteracy still represent 
an enormous challenge for the South. The 2010 free trade area will further 
promote structural reforms, particularly in trade regimes (liberalisation), 
budget and administration, in the private sector (privatisation, restructuring 
and the business environment), in the financial sector and in the labour 
market. Reforms have evolved differently, but generally speaking all the 
Southern partners face serious problems in terms of budgetary transparency, 
sluggish or obstructionist bureaucratic procedures, inefficient judiciaries, and 
inadequate regulatory systems. The impact of EMP cooperation on these 
areas was marginal, failing to trigger the reforms enunciated in the Barcelona 
Declaration, mostly as a result of inexistent benchmarking that might provide 
incentives for reform.
Democratisation and Human Rights
Democracy
Progress towards democracy has fallen short of original expectations, and thus 
the degree of political convergence on which integration is predicated has failed to 
materialise. Most governance indicators, as exempliﬁed in Table 1, point to large 
gaps and negligible progress. Voice and accountability indicators, for example, 
show that Southern states lag very far behind (50%) the EU. 
In some countries inﬂuential political movements with a large popular base are 
banned. On the positive side, there has been some debate on constitutional 
reform and transition to democracy, including on the role of Islamic parties in 
democratisation processes, but these discussions have been limited. However, 
several Southern governments have accepted that post-independence models are 
no longer adequate, and afﬁrm a commitment to political reform.
The Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict has been an obstacle to meaningful debate on 
governance and political reform within the Partnership, but the selective focus of the 
EMP on economic rather than political and social issues is also to blame. To some 
degree this reﬂects a preference for the ﬂexible EU approach to political reform over 
the more coercive US approach. 
There was some 
improvement in the 
human rights situation in 
a number of the Southern 
countries, but this fell 
short of substantive 
progress in most cases.
MAC - Mediterranean Arab Countries.
See Table 2.
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Human Rights
There was some improvement in the human rights situation in a number of the 
Southern countries, but this fell short of substantive progress in most cases. Press 
freedom has improved the most. However, human rights organisations have voiced 
concern over restrictions of civil liberties in the North and South in the wake of 
11 September. The language of rights has gained ground slowly in non-binding 
regional declarations, but promotional activities have not followed suit. Further, civil 
and political rights have been emphasised, although the same cannot be said of 
the rights of women, migrants, and economic and social rights. In short, there is 
no coherent, holistic rights-based approach to development and cooperation. The 
same is true for the regional level, which has been sidelined in favour of a bilateral 
approach focused on civil and political rights. The most promising initiatives are 
therefore bilateral, but it is too early to judge how much of an impact these will 
have given the absence of benchmarks and schedules. The Barcelona Declaration 
states the need to guarantee cultural and religious diversity, but this aspect has not 
been addressed. This is particularly worrying in light of the rise of extremist identity-
based nationalist movements and racist violence to the North and South of the 
Mediterranean. Combating racism and xenophobia has not been speciﬁcally set 
forth as an EMP aim and initiatives in this domain have therefore been lacking. The 
Anna Lindh Foundation is expected to address the issue.
Civil Society
The EMP has promoted increased networking between Southern and Northern civil 
societies and induced support for an impressive number of civil society initiatives in 
a vast array of domains ranging from human rights advocacy to poverty reduction 
efforts. However, support for Southern groups has not been accompanied by legal 
and political reforms, so the impact of civil society activism has often been limited 
to narrow western-educated elites and quasi-governmental NGOs. Civil society 
has had little impact on or participated in conﬁdence-building measures. Religious 
charities – often the most socially relevant – have been excluded entirely, despite 
recommendations made by the 1998 EuroMeSCo Report.
Political and Security Cooperation
Following stagnation and the collapse of the Charter for Peace and Stability, attempts 
were made to revive political and security cooperation in the context of the ESDP, 
promoting the inclusion of Southern partners in EU crisis-management operations. 
The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean system of civil protection is being contemplated. 
Security cooperation also features in Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans.
The EMP has promoted 
increased networking 
between Southern and 
Northern civil societies. 
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Mutual conﬁdence increased signiﬁcantly since 1995, particularly in North-
South relations. The EMP institutions have socialised diplomats and other 
senior ofﬁcials, and special units on the EMP have been created in most foreign 
ministries. South-South conﬁdence building initiatives, however, have been thin 
on the ground, in spite of the coordination mechanisms established among Arab 
members of the Partnership. South-South relations are still to a large extent 
determined by power politics, and marked by mistrust, and ongoing tensions 
and crises, including armed conﬂict and foreign military presence. In the Mashriq, 
tensions are heightened by the persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, 
and unresolved issues involving Israel, Syria and Lebanon. In the Maghrib, the 
Algerian-Moroccan border has yet to be reopened, and the Western Sahara 
question remains unsolved.
Crises and tensions in the Middle East have constituted a major obstacle to 
a meaningful EMP political and security dialogue, although a new willingness 
to address specific security issues at EMP-wide level has recently emerged. 
South-South tensions have made specific confidence-building initiatives almost 
impossible and these tensions were not addressed in the political and security 
dialogue. Political dialogue, and CBMs are designed to facilitate efforts at 
conflict resolution. If CBMs are held hostage to conflict resolution, the logic of 
the measures goes to waste. Thus, the conditionality that has been accepted 
in the EMP is the exact opposite of what these measures are designed to 
achieve.
South-South integration and subregional cooperation
It is hardly surprising that the political momentum for sub-regional initiatives in the 
Maghrib and the Mashriq has failed to materialise. The 1989 Arab Maghrib Union 
and, later, the Middle East multilateral initiatives entered into a prolonged state of 
hibernation. Moreover, the holistic nature of the Barcelona Process was understood 
as outright rejection of differentiation, thus greatly moderating enthusiasm and 
support for sub-regional efforts. The adoption of Neighbourhood signals a major 
shift towards a model based on differentiation. However, the need for sub-regional 
cooperation has not diminished, and attempts to link the 5+5 dialogue to the EMP 
is a step in the right direction. 
South-South integration has taken off the ground with the adoption of the 2001 
Agadir Agreement to liberalise trade between Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt. 
MEDA support for the Agadir process illustrates the rising priority given to South-
South integration initiatives.
Crises and tensions in 
the Middle East have 
constituted a major 
obstacle to a meaningful 
EMP political and security 
dialogue.
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Justice and Home Affairs
Although the rule of law is a central EMP concern as stated in the Barcelona 
Declaration, justice and home affairs (JHA) issues were absent from the agenda until 
the approval of the Valencia JHA regional programme in 2002. The need to address 
rule of law shortcomings in Southern countries has gradually been accepted as an 
essential condition not just for democratisation but also for sustained economic 
development. To date, however, JHA funds have focused on judicial technical 
infrastructure rather than on the promotion of transparency, training and judicial 
independence. The Valencia JHA regional programme is a political and normative 
response to 11 September, with cooperation to combat terrorism gaining greater 
momentum. Although it is possible to observe progress in this area at a declaratory 
level, the absence of a common deﬁnition of terrorism lies at the heart of divergences 
between participating countries. Furthermore, the need to combine anti-terrorism 
with the reinforced conditions for the rule of law has as not been fully addressed, 
given long-standing obstacles in the South and recent Northern retreats. 
The bold aims of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the ﬁeld of justice, police and 
human rights should be seen as inseparable from the current desire to promote reform 
in various Mediterranean countries and show that JHA has acquired an important role 
in the EMP. A number of ‘good practices’ were initiated through the MEDA democracy 
programme and bilaterally, and these have had a positive impact in the countries 
involved, although results are most apparent at the micro-level. These practices reveal 
the importance of mainstreaming human rights into law enforcement training, and of 
reinforcing the protection of lawyers and magistrates, as well as upgrading training levels.
Migration
Efforts to deal with migration and making it part of the second and third chapters have 
been scarce. Trade liberalisation is not accompanied by free circulation of people, 
and migrant integration in the EU has not received sufﬁcient attention. Migration 
and refugee issues are increasingly seen as security problems, and despite the 
opposition of the Commission to a wide-ranging security perspective, many EU  s 
fail to criticise the tendency to place everything under the security umbrella and even 
promote it. Migration is a ‘security risk’ in almost all national strategic doctrines. This 
legitimates anti-immigrant far-right rhetoric in the EU, and feeds the image in the 
South that the EU is succumbing to a ‘clash of civilisations’ vision. Paradoxically, 
this security-based approach to migration co-exists with growing awareness that 
the EU needs more, and not less, migrants for economic and demographic reasons. 
One positive development is that in some countries, migrants are being seen as 
potentially positive actors in Euro-Mediterranean relations and as net contributors 
to the development of their countries of origin.
Security-based approach 
to migration co-exists 
with growing awareness 
that the EU needs more 
migrants.
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Awareness and Perceptions
EuroMeSCo studies systematically show that beyond governmental circles there 
is a notable lack of knowledge about the EMP in the North and South alike. In 
Europe there is widespread criticism of the EMP because of the rhetoric-reality 
gap although the potential of the framework is recognised on both sides. In the 
Maghrib and the Middle East the demand for closer relations with the EU is strong, 
and most continue to believe that the EMP is the best way to fulﬁl the promise 
of the Barcelona Declaration, but there are concerns about the capacity of the 
EMP to bring about socio-economic and political change. For some, the Process 
is overly inter-governmental and protective of the status quo, while others fear that 
EU enlargement may accentuate the existing asymmetries. The proliferation of EU 
and US promoted reform initiatives is another source of anxiety, as it is feared that 
the EMP may be diluted or sidelined. Addressing negative mutual perceptions is a 
central challenge that has only been partially addressed to date. In fact, perceptions 
on both sides are rather contradictory: EuroMeSCo surveys show that the public in 
Southern countries believes that the North sees it as a security threat, particularly 
after 11 September and 11 March, but at the same time, the war in Iraq highlighted a 
remarkable convergence of public opinion North and South in support for multilateral 
options. 
In what concerns particularly the South, there is still a perception that the EMP 
is to a great extent a European project evolving in accordance with the Union’s 
capacity to forge common positions on Mediterranean issues. The attempt by the 
Southern states to lock into concepts offered by the North is perceived as being 
complicated not only by the explicit/implicit divide in Europe’s agenda, and by the 
plethora of initiatives, but also by the fact that different European goals have been 
highlighted at different times, and are constantly evolving, in response to events 
and developments on the ground. A supplementary factor that renders difﬁcult any 
attempt to assess European goals for the EMP is the implicit trans-Atlantic agenda of 
certain initiatives, such as the’ EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East’. In short, the need for a clariﬁcation of the European position vis-à-
vis the Mediterranean is a concern expressed in many analysis from the South.
Momentum for Reform
The EMP has had an impact on Southern economic development, and has promoted 
links between civil society and even contributed to the development of shared 
values and a sense of a common destiny. However, it has had little or no impact 
on political convergence despite the global recognition of the political value of the 
Partnership, human rights have had a very low proﬁle, and before the creation of the 
Anna Lindh Foundation there was no anti-racist or anti-xenophobia action. Security 
The war in Iraq highlighted 
a remarkable convergence 
of public opinion North 
and South.
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and defence, migration, police and judicial cooperation have been recognised as 
priority areas but results so far have been disappointing. Despite the high hopes 
raised by the Agadir Agreement, the EMP has been unable to function as a catalyst 
for sub-regional integration as envisaged in the Barcelona Declaration. 
There is a sense of disappointment in the South, as reformist sectors resent the 
caution with which the EMP promotes democratic governance and human rights, 
while others resent even timid action on the grounds that such obligations are 
being met or that Europeans fail to appreciate local difﬁculties. The South deplores 
increasing xenophobia and restrictions on labour mobility, partly a result of the 
2001 terrorist attacks. There is an awareness of the short- to medium-term social 
pressures of economic restructuring, particularly the loss of custom revenue for the 
state, and its often inadequate replacement by indirect taxation on consumption. 
The same is true for the implications of limited foreign direct investment, a key 
to economic recovery, particularly in terms of continued unemployment and its 
concomitant social and political pressures.
Nonetheless, there is an awareness of the signiﬁcant impetus that the Partnership has 
given to regional cooperation, and it is felt that should greater European commitment 
and greater Southern willingness to undertake political reform real progress in the 
political and security aims of the Barcelona Declaration can be achieved.
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III. A New Context and Renewed Hopes
There is arguably stronger convergence between the agendas of North and South 
and around the principles of the Partnership than was the case in 1995. This is a 
product of various factors. 
First, there is the sense that there is no credible alternative to the EMP and that 
international tensions would further increase and national reforms fail if it were to 
disappear. 
Second, there is a new vision of the link between economic development and 
democratisation. The view of the 1990s – reﬂected in the Barcelona Process 
– that economic liberalisation leads to democratisation has been challenged by 
events in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Although there is some degree 
of causality, the view is that each process must be pursued on its own merit. The 
EMP cannot avoid this issue given the intense democratisation debate going on in 
the Mediterranean and Middle East, and civil society and reformist sector demands 
for its deepening. A consensus of sorts has emerged in the region, and EMP aims 
have become more acceptable.
Third, there is a new attitude towards political Islam, with a gradual abandonment 
of the view that it is simply a problem to resolve, and the adoption of the more 
positive view that peaceful movements must be involved in the process of 
democratisation. These movements are a growing and inescapable reality in most 
South Mediterranean countries, and the integration of Islamic parties into the political 
process has contributed to changing the way that such movements are perceived 
in Europe.
Fourth, there is a renewed focus of international initiatives to promote 
democratic reform, given the US focus on the issue. The US Greater Middle 
East Initiative, proposed free trade agreements, the G8 proposals (which 
adopted EMP ﬁnancial and economic goals) have contributed to put the debate 
on reform on the international agenda. Many question the credibility of US 
democracy promoting initiatives given their association with the war in Iraq. The 
more gradual, consensual policy of democratic inclusion has therefore gained in 
legitimacy and credibility.
Fifth, although the Middle East conﬂict and the failure of the Oslo Accords and the 
Israeli-Syrian stalemate continue to have a profound impact on the Partnership, 
and although it is hard to predict how those conﬂicts may evolve in the near future, 
the Palestinian presidential and forthcoming legislative elections have undeniably 
opened a new window of opportunity and reinforced legitimacy and negotiating 
capacity of the PNA. 
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Sixth, the most recent EU enlargement, which almost doubled the number of 
member states, has radically transformed the EU neighbourhood with obvious 
implications for European foreign policy. The Neighbourhood Policy initiative is at 
least partly a result of and a response to the changes wrought by enlargement, and 
has the potential to improve North-South political cooperation in the short- and 
medium-term.
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IV. A Community of Democratic States
It is now necessary to deﬁne the central aims of the Partnership more explicitly 
in light of the Barcelona Declaration, and in response to the assessment of 
the successes and failures of the Process to date, the emergence of the 
Neighbourhood Policy (which forces the EU to confront the issue of migration 
in light of one of the four freedoms – the free movement of people), and given 
the demands of the public on both shores of the Mediterranean. This new, and 
more complex focus on democracy also brings the question of cultural diversity 
to the fore, and further forces the partners to focus on the question of social 
cohesion as a fundamental element of successful economic reform and free 
trade arrangements: democracy, cultural diversity and social cohesion must work 
in tandem with security policies that are compatible with the principles enshrined 
in the Barcelona Declaration.
Peace, Democracy and Human Rights:
Congruence and Implementation
The attainment of peace and democracy in the South through a process of inclusion 
is explicitly stated in the Constitutional Treaty, Article I-57 of which states that, ‘the 
Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to 
establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of 
the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.’ 
The formulation of principles and values in the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Neighbourhood Policy is more explicit than that stated in the original Barcelona 
Declaration, namely on such issues as respect for minorities and justice. There are 
also explicit references to gender equality and the protection of the rights of the 
child. The Neighbourhood Policy, in turn, states that relations with neighbours will 
build on ‘commitments to common values, including democracy, the rule of law, 
good governance and respects for human rights, and to the principles of market 
economy, free trade and sustainable development as well as poverty reduction.’1 
Neighbourhood Action Plans include detailed programmes to strengthen national 
commitments to these values, including the respect for fundamental freedoms such 
as freedom of expression and the rights of minorities, as well as support for civil society. 
Although with the Neighbourhood Policy the values and objectives of the Barcelona 
Declaration are made more explicit, the EMP and the Association Agreements had 
already taken this on board as a commitment. Indeed, the Association Agreements 
all include clauses stating that respect for democratic principles and fundamental 
human rights are ‘essential elements’ of the Agreements. The fact that many states 
had differing agendas in 1995 does not invalidate these values as key points of 
reference for democratic scrutiny. 
The EMP must be 
made congruent 
with Neighbourhood, 
fully integrating 
Neighbourhood 
arrangements and 
methods into the 
Barcelona framework, 
as was the case with the 
Association Agreements.
1 Council Conclusions of 14.06.2004 on the ENP, 10189/04
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Making these values and principles work in reality across the EMP is considered an 
essential aim. It constitutes the essence of the ‘potential acquis’, and gives credence 
to the proposal of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States, 
a vision without historical precedent based on inclusion within diversity – that is 
the logical consequence of the principles and aims that inform the Barcelona 
Declaration. If such a Community fails to materialise, Neighbourhood – which 
stresses bilateralism and differentiation over multilateralism and regionalism – would 
be more ambitious than the EMP. As a consequence, the EMP would irredeemably 
lose its identity and political relevance. The EMP must therefore be made congruent 
with Neighbourhood, fully integrating Neighbourhood arrangements and methods 
into the Barcelona framework, as was the case with the Association Agreements.
Inclusion within Diversity
The idea of ‘inclusion in diversity’ requires clariﬁcation particularly in light of the so-
called ‘cultural divide’ and the persistent Southern and Northern perception that 
there is a real danger of a ‘clash of civilisations.’ The US response to 11 September 
was to initiate a war on ‘global’ terror and to go to war in Iraq, and many viewed this 
as the beginning of the much-heralded clash. In Europe, 11 March 2004 heightened 
such fears, although the response of the Spanish public to the attack was to refuse 
to publicise the nationalities of the accused, or to see the event as a product of a 
speciﬁc culture or country. This, and the convergence over the Iraq war show that 
the gap between the two sides of the Mediterranean is not as wide as has been 
suggested. 
The proposed ‘dialogue of civilisations’ is seen as an important instrument to combat 
the Huntingtonian vision of a ‘clash of civilisations’, but the dialogue is not really the 
most appropriate response to the current wave of identity-based views emerging 
in the North and South. It fails to counter the idea that ‘civilisation’ is an adequate 
conceptual framework. The dialogue is based on the notion that there must be mutual 
tolerance between civilisations, which should coexist peacefully as self-contained 
social and cultural entities. Even though this is preferable to xenophobic intolerance, 
it perpetuates the notion that ‘dialogue’ and ‘conﬂict’ between ‘civilisation’ is the 
central axis of international discourse and action, with nations lumped together as 
part of a culturally and religiously deﬁned collective. Cultural factors are obviously a 
powerful generator of solidarity among peoples, but they are by no means the sole 
or even the strongest generators of convergence.
The Euro-Mediterranean Community should replace the notion of ‘tolerant 
coexistence’ with that of ‘inclusion within diversity.’ The notion of ‘hospitality’ and 
of not regarding the ‘other’ as intrinsically different but rather as intrinsically similar 
or equal – ideas put forward by Jacques Derrida – is a more appropriate framework 
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with which to deal with the cultural question. The difference between one and the 
other is not trivial: what, after all, is the appropriate ‘level of tolerance’, particularly in 
a context where people fear migrants will challenge the absorptive capacity of host 
states and societies? Although this has been a primarily European debate, South-
South migration raises similar dilemmas. The distinction is of crucial importance, in 
fact, and the solution must be to transcend the civilisation boundaries altogether 
and move towards a universal view of human rights and needs.
In short, the temptation to deﬁne societal phenomena in terms of distinct groups 
of states or political movements along ethnic, cultural, religious or ‘civilisational’ 
lines must be resisted. These are concepts that are synonymous with division. The 
alternative is to focus on the inclusion of diversity from the outset, as the criterion 
with which to measure the capacity of states and societies to integrate and remain 
respectful of cultural and religious diversity. The only way to do this is to be strictly 
observant of human rights and freedoms in a rule of law context, both within and 
without the conﬁnes of nations or regions. This is, in fact, the value-added of the 
Barcelona Process – the fact that it is a true attempt to achieve this kind of inclusion 
within diversity over the whole Euro-Mediterranean region. EU membership 
negotiations between the EU and Turkey constitute a powerful stimulus in this 
regard, as the EU will have to adopt this approach when addressing its own political 
identity issues and the question of cultural diversity.
Migration as a Driving Force of Integration
In line with the basic principles of democratic inclusion and hospitality, the prospect 
of free circulation of persons would represent a radical shift away from the original 
Barcelona agenda and should be a key component of Barcelona Plus. Increased 
human mobility at global scale is putting migrations at the centre of political agendas. 
The presence of migrant communities in Europe is leading to a redeﬁnition of basic 
concepts such as citizenship, identity and, ultimately, democracy. Although the 
Barcelona Declaration recognised the importance of the role played by migration 
in the relationship between partner countries, the EMP agenda soon showed that 
there was an implicit purpose to limit migration to Europe by addressing the push 
factors in Southern Mediterranean countries. At the same time, security concerns 
have been dominant and were heightened after 11 September.
This limited vision contrasts with that of Barcelona and the core values of human 
dignity, democratic inclusion and solidarity. Over the last ten years, there has been a 
slight shift, with the Neighbourhood Policy marking a turning point with its long-term 
goal of promoting access to the European Single Market with the free circulation of 
people between the EU and its neighbouring regions. This is in contradiction with 
the intention of the Barcelona Process to promote economic development with a 
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view to, among other elements, reduce migratory pressures. This contradiction can 
be resolved by making free circulation of people an essential feature of the future 
Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States.
The change in approach of the Neighbourhood Policy has complex origins. On the 
one hand, European states have come to realise that they need migrants to ensure 
an adequate supply of labour, and this has forced them to deal with the issue of 
social inclusion and to determine what approach to adopt towards the problems 
associated with multiculturalism. The Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial conferences 
reveal the evolution in attitudes, from initially treating migration as a soft security 
concern to adopting a view of North-South demographic complementarity, solidarity 
and minimising threat perceptions. In fact, trans-national migration is challenging 
various existing policies. In a community of democratic states, trans-nationalism 
can be a source of migrant empowerment in relations with country of origin and 
host country authorities. Cross border political action by migrants can reshape 
national citizenship and decision-making bodies, because migrants can become 
signiﬁcant actors to promote democracy and social justice. Europe must avoid a 
security paradigm, which is at odds both with the EMP and with the Neighbourhood 
Policy.
Social Cohesion and Democratic Outcomes
The EMP was predicated upon the idea that economic development would necessarily 
promote political and administrative reform. Both would in turn promote more 
cohesive societies as the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area reached completion 
in 2010. In reality, however, economic change in the Southern Mediterranean 
has failed to achieve such social and political changes. This is a serious failure 
because, although political change is initially about institutional reform, social 
cohesion becomes necessary if polities are to withstand the shock of reform and 
restructuring. Social cohesion is about the ability of a society to incorporate change 
without rupture and this depends making economic development socially just. 
There has been little social progress in the Southern Mediterranean despite 
the reforms of the past ﬁve years, and the prospects in the short term are not 
encouraging. The promise of a stake in the Single Market with the Neighbourhood 
Policy offers a possible solution to this problem, as long as the EU uses it to forge 
the kind of solidarity that allowed European populations to become more socially 
cohesive. Thus, it is essential that the importance of solidarity and supporting 
Southern social cohesion is recognised, as a way to ensure the success of this 
collective experiment in sustainable and peaceful economic social and political 
development. Social cohesion is, indeed, an end in itself, both in the EMP and the 
Neighbourhood Policy. It is a constituent element in the creation of a social fabric 
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that buttresses economic development and democratic governance. As the EU 
enlargement process shows, there is an essential and positive dialectic between 
democratic governance and social cohesion, and without it economic development 
fails to achieve its social purpose.
Citizen Security
The promotion of peace and security is an EMP aim since 1995. For some it was 
actually the aim of the new Partnership. There are still inter-state tensions in the 
Mediterranean area that undermine regional integration, but the likelihood of war has 
declined since 1995. The basic problem facing the countries of the Mediterranean 
today is violence against civilians. The banalisation and routinisation of violence 
against civilians, including political leaders, as legitimate political targets of aggression 
is perhaps the single most important impediment to the establishment of a culture 
of peace in the region, and certainly to the creation of democratic and rule of law 
structures, which increase the potential for respect for basic rights, particularly the 
right to physical integrity.
Indeed, the most worrying issue from a security perspective is this banal and routine 
high level of violence against ordinary people: more than 150,000 of them have 
died since 1995 as a result of political violence, particularly on the Southern margin 
of the Mediterranean – the Maghrib and the Middle East – where practically no 
country has been spared, although the North also has suffered the consequences 
of this deeply embedded dynamic, as Madrid witnessed with the most deadly act of 
violence against civilians in Europe of the last decades.
The EMP has been unable to agree on a common deﬁnition of terrorism, and even 
less to devise a common strategy to combat it. This is hardly surprising in light of 
the conceptual and practical difﬁculties. The difﬁculties of differentiating between 
terrorism and acts of political violence that are legitimated on grounds of political 
liberation is an age old problem, as is the inherent practical tension between security 
and the preservation of hard earned civil liberties. Even the UN, which is the foremost 
international institution with a mandate to promote global peace and security, has 
had trouble in this area. Although there are 12 international conventions on terrorism 
that focus on partial aspects of the general phenomenon, there is no established 
deﬁnition of the term, and the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee is currently 
considering a draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, aimed at 
reaching some consensus on the content of the term. The simple deﬁnition that the 
EMP should adopt, which would make a major contribution to the global debate, is 
to focus on citizens who are victims of terrorist acts. By doing so, the Partnership 
– and the Community in the future – can contribute to defending ordinary citizens 
from state and non-state violence. It must help to promote a culture of respect 
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for the physical integrity of the individual in all circumstances at the heart of the 
anti-terrorist ﬁght. This is a task that is urgent not only in the South but also the 
North: new anti-terrorist legislation in Western countries that are clearly in violation 
of established international human rights standards, show that this is a problem for 
all societies, and not just the Southern Mediterranean. 
The development of a security culture based on multilateral action, and a clear 
rejection of violence as a political weapon to be deployed against civilians, as well as 
on a clear understanding that such violence is illegitimate under any circumstances 
is the only way to work towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic 
States. Indeed, this should be one of the ﬁve pillars of the EMP.
The Identity of Barcelona Plus as a Regional Group
The spirit and principles of the Barcelona Declaration and the EMP are notable when 
placed in a wider international context: the EMP is multi-regional project without 
historical precedent because of the cultural diversity of its members. In current 
circumstances, this experience is of the highest signiﬁcance, and this should be 
clearly enunciated at Barcelona 2005. A reformed EMP is not just a project for the 
Mediterranean – it is one that pre-ﬁgures a different international order that is based 
on norms and rules that are universally deﬁned. A reformed EMP could become a 
constituent part of a new multilateral order, in which regionalism and regional civil 
societies participate as essential elements. 
If the principles and values of the EMP as a regional group are to be made explicit, 
it is essential to analyse the degree to which its policies and decision-making 
mechanisms allow it to attain its central aim: establishing a zone of peace and 
democracy, underpinned by societies that converge not only politically but also 
socially and economically. It is also essential to analyse the current regional and 
international contexts so as to be able to highlight what is speciﬁc and unique 
about EMP, particularly in light of the current proliferation of reform and cooperation 
initiatives. In doing so, the following key points are essential. 
First, the EMP is a regional group project that aims to become a Euro-Mediterranean 
Community of Democratic States over the long-term. The EMP should project itself 
as a regional integration project with an international identity. It is no longer the child 
of the OSCE, which originally inspired it, but an open regionalism project. Within 
the region, open regionalism should be understood as the assertion at the state 
level of the values of an open society – political democracy, cultural and religious 
diversity and popular participation by its citizens. From outside the region, this 
means promoting identical principles and free trade in relations with other states 
and regimes. 
A reformed EMP is not 
just a project for the 
Mediterranean – it is one 
that pre-ﬁgures a different 
international order that 
is based on norms and 
rules that are universally 
deﬁned.
Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States
37
Second, fundamental rights, democracy, the rule of law, the principle of association 
among states and, with it, the de-legitimisation power politics, are at the core of 
the Barcelona enterprise, and turning them into a reality throughout the region is 
indispensable to ensure peace and security.
Third, cultural and religious diversity is an essential aspect of the Process and must 
be safeguarded. Given the nature of the EU and its historical experience, economic 
relations are an important instrument to further sustainable development and enable 
the political and social aspects of the Partnership to ﬂourish: in other words, these 
aims are interdependent. 
Fourth and ﬁnally the EMP proposes a multilateral vision of governance for the 
international system. 
The success of the Barcelona Process as a mechanism to build a regional group 
depends on how the EMP deals with the current international context. The most 
immediate problem is the centrifugal pressures exerted by bilateralism and the series 
of new initiatives targeting the Mediterranean region emanating from the EU and the 
US. The Neighbourhood Policy introduces two new elements that are absent from 
the EMP: a stronger emphasis on bilateral relations and the concept of ‘positive 
differentiation’. Both allow countries that reform faster to distance themselves 
from the EMP collective. This was demonstrated clearly in the application of the 
Neighbourhood Policy to non-Mediterranean countries – Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and even Russia, although to date it has rejected 
the European proposal. Further, the Neighbourhood Policy differs from the EMP 
in that it proposes that participating states have ‘a stake in the Common Market’ 
or get to have ‘everything but the institutions’, in the words of former Commission 
president Romano Prodi.
One possible solution to the potential divergence between the two initiatives is to 
establish different objectives for Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean neighbours: 
for the former the end goal is the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic 
States. If the partners agree to integrate the Neighbourhood Policy with the EMP 
in November 2005 and to clarify their political and economic objectives, the Euro-
Mediterranean regional group project will gain a new lease of life.
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V. Building ‘Barcelona Plus’
through Good Practice
This section describes a series of recommendations outlining the kinds of reform of 
the EMP if a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States is to be achieved. 
At their meeting in November 2005, EMP ministers should not only reafﬁrm and 
broaden the principles of the Barcelona Process, but should also endorse an Action 
Plan – along the lines of the Valencia Action Plan – which would be implemented 
by 2015. It would concentrate on the ﬁve major pillars of measures described in the 
previous section. The new Action Plan should also pay particular attention to issues 
of sub-regional integration and the visibility of the EMP.
Implementation of Democracy
The objective of promoting democracy, through mutually agreed benchmarks, 
means that democracy must become an issue within the Partnership in its own right. 
This, in turn, will mean that civil society will have to be involved in the Partnership, 
again, as a full actor and in its own right. The Southern partners must also be able to 
acquire a far greater sense of ownership of the Partnership and particular attention 
will have to be given to human rights issues. Such objectives will require that the 
following conditions be met:
Making democratisation a key aim: The EMP should actively participate in the 
debate on political reform in the Mediterranean and the Middle East by making 
democracy and human rights central goals of the Barcelona Process. It must 
confront the issue of the relationship between good governance and freedom. 
The role of political Islam as a component of the political diversity that is innate to 
democratic governance and the way in which its integration might be achieved must 
also be made explicit. The Barcelona Declaration should be ampliﬁed to include 
an addendum which would incorporate Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans, thus 
making the essential linkage between the EMP and a future Euro-Mediterranean 
Community of Democratic States. States that fail to meet the criteria would not be 
in a position to join the Community.
Promoting political participation: The process of Euro-Mediterranean 
integration should involve the widest possible number of political forces. Enlarged 
political participation would help to strengthen the political and social base of the 
Partnership. It would also help to consolidate the participation of political parties in 
the political process and, consequently, would help to foster pluralism. This could 
be done through speciﬁc programmes aimed at developing contacts between 
parliamentarians in EMP countries and by strengthening the Parliamentary Assembly. 
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The European Parliament’s role in the Partnership should be enhanced, in line with 
the new powers that the European Constitution grants it. The two main criteria 
by which political forces could be engaged in dialogue should be the rejection of 
the use of violence and their degree of involvement with their publics, whatever 
the religious or cultural backgrounds involved. Moderate Islamist parties, therefore, 
should not be excluded from this process.
Making civil society a leading actor: The experience of attempts at engaging 
civil society organisations in the Partnership over the last decade shows that the link 
with civil society needs to be completely overhauled. This applies to the involvement 
of civil society movements in the EMP, not just to programme implementation, and 
also to the formulation of the agenda for their involvement. This means expanding 
the areas in which civil society can participate to include issues such as political 
involvement, freedom of speech issues and non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
regulatory legislation. It is necessary to establish objective criteria for the selection of 
NGO partners in order to avoid discrimination based on political or religious factors. 
Civil society in Southern countries should be surveyed so that the dimensions of the 
civil society sector can be quantiﬁed. 
Promoting and mainstreaming human rights: Fulﬁlling human rights objectives 
means strengthening the regional approach. EMP governments should establish a 
task force to implement existing instruments, to assess how the components of the 
Process interact with and affect human rights (the complex relation between free 
trade, the rights of migrants, women, and economic and social rights and the rule 
of law is one example), and to propose actions to promote these rights. The task 
force should propose relevant dialogue mechanisms with key regional human rights 
organisations. A prerequisite for productive dialogue is the need to ensure efﬁcient 
and sustained ﬁnancial support for local and regional organisations working on 
human rights and to encourage the lifting of legal restraints on civil society activities. 
At the bilateral level, the focus should be on the introduction of clear benchmarks 
and timelines to permit progress assessment in accordance with established 
international standards rather than on a political basis. Last and most important, 
EMP governments must agree to work towards the highest possible human rights 
standards and not opt for the lowest common denominator in this respect.
Inclusion within Diversity
Concrete action in this pillar should focus on two main aspects. Firstly, the reiﬁcation 
of the principle of hospitality and, second, a renewed interest in the area of education. 
More speciﬁcally, this requires: 
Promoting ‘hospitality’ in EMP cultural cooperation: Inter-civilisational dialogue 
is often seen as an alternative to political reform. But this is to institutionalise the 
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failure of mutual understanding in the Euro-Mediterranean relationship. It makes 
Islam the factor identifying the countries of the South rather than their political, 
economic and social aspirations or the different political options of governing elites. 
The concept of ‘hospitality’ rather than of ‘dialogue between civilisations’ should 
guide cultural cooperation. This means putting cultural pluralism at the centre of 
cooperation. Artistic and literary initiatives should be funded on the basis of their 
intrinsic artistic quality. This should become the guiding principle of the Anna Lindh 
Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the  Dialogue of Cultures.
Prioritising education: Education has gained increased visibility in EMP Initiatives. 
Examples such as the extension of the Tempus programme or the Education and 
Training for Employment regional programme are signiﬁcant steps forward in this 
respect. Given the importance of promoting mutual understanding and knowledge 
amongst peoples, ensuring equal conditions for participation in public life, and 
addressing the needs of young people and the difﬁculties women face when 
accessing educational systems should be part of a more structured education policy. 
Although cooperation in the ﬁeld of higher education is an important objective, lack 
of knowledge about academic systems and educational structures North and South 
limits potential cooperation and constitutes an obstacle to the full involvement of 
universities as Partnership actors. Alongside existing exchange programmes, a 
network of universities could be established, within which specialised exchange 
and mobility programmes could take place. The facilitation of access to the internet 
and other information infrastructure such as databases or documentation centres 
should also be promoted.
Migration as a Driving Force of Integration
Migrations represent the pillar where greater movement is needed as far as the 
original Barcelona approach is concerned and, for practical effects to be achieved, 
it will be necessary to engage immigrants as partnership actors. There is a growing 
demand from civil society for a new approach towards migrants as generators of 
social, cultural and economic beneﬁts and as agents of decentralised cooperation. 
Trans-nationalism can empower migrants in their relations with host and home 
country authorities, and develop new concepts of citizenship and forms of decision-
making. Given the central objective of promoting decentralised involvement of civil 
society in the implementation of the Partnership, a Euro-Mediterranean Federation 
of non-governmental immigrant associations should be set up, as proposed in 2001 
by the Euro-Med Civil Forum. This would help to promote immigrant communities 
from the South as key actors in social and economic development and in political 
and cultural relations. They should also become agents of co-development and a 
driving force to promote democracy and social justice. Particular attention should 
be paid to improving visa regimes in Europe, particularly for businessmen, students 
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and tourists, and to establishing more equitable asylum policies throughout the 
Union. The efﬁcacy of ﬁnancial tools for development must be improved, and new 
tools created to attract and channel migrant remittances for national development 
and to encourage business and employment creation. The current development 
of tools such as micro credit could be extended, if undertaken in partnership with 
commercial banks.
Promoting Development with Social Cohesion 
Deﬁning the Barcelona Process as the process of creating a regional group 
means that the free trade area must be in place by 2010. Economic relations are 
the mainstay of the Partnership, although these cannot be attained at the cost of 
ignoring social cohesion or the aggravated social disparities that may result from 
the implementation of the FTA. This means adopting political and economic criteria 
to assess progress with political reform. Such criteria – measures of administrative 
efﬁciency, regulatory structures, observance of the rule-of-law and controlling 
corruption – should have a dual utility. They can establish the eligibility of partners 
for membership of the Euro-Mediterranean Community, and they would enable the 
monitoring of progress to take place. Applying the principle of co-responsibility, EU 
regional aid and private investment should be expanded to promote infrastructure 
integration. These developments strengthen mutual interdependence and thus 
contribute to building conﬁdence. Free trade must also be accompanied by funds 
that mitigate the social costs of adjustment, namely by promoting education, 
training, administrative modernisation, the development of basic infrastructures, 
and the promotion of competitiveness and innovation.
Citizen Security
Security should not become the driving force behind the Barcelona Plus process. 
Thus, all linkages between internal and external security which primarily serve to 
reinforce such attitudes must be avoided. Equally, expanded concepts of security 
that tend to see all social questions, including migration, as security concerns and 
thus undermine democratic approaches to such issues must be avoided. The EMP 
should be able to develop a concept of security that is both compatible with its 
basic values and allows it to deal with real security problems in the region and in the 
neighbourhood.
Promoting security and defence cooperation: The past ten years of EMP 
political and security cooperation suggest that there has been great difﬁculty in 
establishing common ground and in implementing common actions and policies. 
EuroMeSCo surveys of Southern perceptions of ESDP have shown that there is 
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a serious lack of information regarding its aims, which fuels misplaced fears and 
expectations. ESDP dialogue and cooperation must be a part of the EMP, since 
this is the umbrella under which maximum synergies can be achieved. In addition 
to continuing its efforts to develop practical initiatives for security cooperation (as in 
the ﬁeld of land mine clearance, for example), the EMP should also make use of the 
possibilities for reinforced cooperation offered by the Neighbourhood Policy in the 
security and defence ﬁelds. 
Fostering civil protection and humanitarian aid cooperation: The positive 
results achieved in the pilot phase of the project for the creation of a Euro-
Mediterranean system of mitigation, prevention and management of natural and 
man-made disasters should form the basis for launching a more permanent structure 
of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the ﬁeld of civil protection. In time, this could 
lead to joint Euro-Mediterranean relief operations, both within and outside the region. 
Experience gained with these operations could also be extended to humanitarian 
aid intervention. There is currently no early warning system in the Mediterranean 
for natural phenomena such as earthquakes or tsunamis, such as the one that hit 
Southeast Asia at the end of 2004. The EMP should consider the creation of a jointly 
managed early-warning system for this type of phenomenon.
Promoting security and justice cooperation: The absence of a properly 
structured dialogue in the ﬁeld of Justice and Home Affairs was recognised by the 
EMP. It envisaged setting up Euro-Mediterranean networks of police ofﬁcers and 
magistrates under the JHA regional programme. However, a most appropriate 
structure for dialogue on security and justice would be one where law enforcement 
agents, magistrates, lawyers and human rights activists meet to engage in 
establishing common principles and a common language. Justice and human rights 
perspectives are fundamental to security dialogue, as is the reverse case. Above all, 
the reinforcement of democracy and the protection of rights and freedoms will not be 
a reality without a basic reform of judicial systems that allows for total independence 
of the judiciary. The possibility of a Euro-Mediterranean ombudsman, able to 
receive complaints about the mismanagement of Partnership objectives, should 
be considered. The ombudsman could issue recommendations to participating 
countries that would highlight problems of justice and governance.
Promoting cooperation in multilateral institutions: EMP member-states 
should seek a convergence of views on key international issues and adopt common 
positions in United Nations bodies. Regular meetings such as those that the EU 
already holds with the countries of Latin America could be instituted in New York 
and Geneva. Whatever the ultimate outcome, the evident failure of the US-led war 
on terrorism to promote global security provides ample evidence that unilateralism is 
not a credible alternative to multilateral governance and this suggests that ‘effective 
multilateralism’ should be a major EMP goal.
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Promoting Sub-Regional Cooperation
The success of the Partnership depends on regional or sub-regional cooperation 
and integration. Indeed, sub-regional integration is probably the most effective way 
of achieving EMP objectives of peace and development. For example, the aim of a 
Euro-Mediterranean free trade area cannot be achieved without major progress in 
integration in the South. Sub-regional integration initiatives can also help to bridge 
the current institutional asymmetry between North and South. In this context, the 
implementation of the Agadir Agreement would mean a major change towards 
cooperation in regional dynamics and should be enlarged to all Southern partners. 
It is the essential concomitant which could guarantee the achievement of the goal of 
the free trade area. At the same time, parallel sub-regional initiatives in the Maghrib 
and in the Middle East have a deeper political impact than the EMP alone and, in the 
Maghrib in particular, reﬂect general historical aspirations. Nonetheless, the political 
problems that render sub-regional cooperation extremely difﬁcult must not be allowed 
to hinder the initiation of small or large-scale projects which have been agreed 
upon by the Partners. Indeed, they should encourage sub-regionalism in either the 
Middle East or the Maghrib. The kinds of projects that could be used to positively 
inﬂuence ingrained historical prejudice could include initiatives in infrastructure 
linked to Community programmes or, subsequently, to the programmes of the 
member-states. An excellent example of what this could mean, certainly in terms of 
national symbols, the construction of a motorway linking together the cities of Tunis, 
Algiers, Rabat and Tangier. This could eventually be extended, through a tunnel, 
onto the European landmass. A deﬁnitive solution for two states, such as Israel and 
Palestine, could reveal extraordinary opportunities for regional cooperation in the 
Middle East, given Israel’s technical and ﬁnancial expertise. Sub-regional initiatives 
in other domains, such as political dialogue, would be useful to help prevent conﬂict 
and build conﬁdence. Other sub-regional groupings, such as the 5+5 Process and 
the Mediterranean Forum, could be used to promote political and security initiatives 
between those states prepared to participate, provided that the state concerned 
could guarantee its acceptance of the objectives of Barcelona Plus.
Increasing the Visibility of the EMP
Another aspect of these problems of perceptions of the EMP is that the Partnership 
hardly impinges on public awareness, either in the South or the North. This occurs 
partly for the reasons given above but also for other, more speciﬁc reasons as well. 
It is not simply a question of the lack of good information about the Partnership, 
although this is a problem in itself, especially when such information lacks real 
content, being propagandistic in nature. It is also a consequence of innate short-
comings within the Barcelona Process itself, in terms of what it covers and the 
initiatives it proposes. Any response to this problem will require that the agenda of 
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the Process be re-focussed on the kinds of issues that have been identiﬁed by our 
surveys as reﬂecting perceptions of its defects on both sides of the Mediterranean. 
Most of those issues have been identiﬁed in this report; they include concerns such 
as political reform, migration or social cohesion. They also include, however, more 
contentious issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict which is another central 
concern in the South. This, ironically enough, demonstrates how the image and 
reputation of the EMP can be unavoidably linked to a process or a situation that it 
does not control. 
Simply identifying the issue, of course, will not be enough, for it will be crucial 
to propose concrete initiatives that reﬂect the priorities placed upon them by 
public opinion. Nor will action alone be sufﬁcient, for public opinion in both the 
North and the South must be made aware of what the Partnership intends to do 
over them. In other words, it is not just a question of ensuring that governments 
and bureaucracies are aware of what is happening. A conscious effort must also 
be made to engage the public directly; something that the Partnership – either 
because of its ignorance or through timidity – has failed to address effectively in the 
past. This in turn will mean that the control and dissemination of such information 
cannot be simply a technocratic, bureaucratic and administrative responsibility but 
will require a political and professional public relations approach. It will also mean 
that the innate bureaucratic tendency to concentrate inter-governmental links into 
ministries and institutions directly connected to the operation of the EMP must 
be countered by ensuring that information ﬂows extend within administrations to 
ensure that all those engaged by the EMP, however marginal their role, are aware 
of what is happening.
As part of this process, it is essential to ‘brand’ EMP initiatives, so as to highlight them 
in the public consciousness and to distinguish them from the ever-increasing number 
of initiatives that are now beginning to emerge, whether European (Neighbourhood 
Policy), American (Broader Middle East and North Africa) or multilateral. Unless this 
is done, public opinion will not only be confused but will also lose awareness of the 
speciﬁc uniqueness of the EMP and of its relationship to the Euro-Mediterranean 
scene. There are four principles that should inform such an approach, in the short-
term, at least:
‘Brand’ Barcelona: This will require presentation that clearly identiﬁes each 
initiative speciﬁcally as an integral part of the Partnership. Thus, for example, the 
MEDA programme should not be presented as a separate funding initiative but 
as an integral part of the EMP, something which must be reﬂected in all publicity 
connected with the programme itself; 
Liberate Barcelona from bureaucratic control by denying bureaucracies the 
monopoly of implementation; 
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Publicise Barcelona: Information about ‘good practice’ within the EMP must be 
disseminated through an efﬁcient communication strategy; and
Network Barcelona: The EMP should make better use of the networks it has 
created, by establishing a network of the various networks that have been created 
over the past decade. This will only be effective if institutions in the South that 
participate in such networks are strengthened as existing asymmetries between 
North and South are a major factor in weakening the effectiveness of the networks 
that have already been created.
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VI. Barcelona Plus:
Institutional Asymmetry and Ownership
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has produced a complicated institutional 
system in that it inherited the particularities of European decision-making, together 
with speciﬁc mechanisms designed to ensure the participation of Southern 
members. The system has not yet been fully rationalised and is often criticised for 
its inefﬁciency and for its asymmetry.
Euro-Mediterranean bilateral cooperation largely depends on the quality of interaction 
between the bureaucracies on both sides of the Mediterranean. The system has 
become reasonably responsive over recent years and the triennial programme 
system is a real improvement, compared to the protocol system in use before the 
Partnership was launched. The reform of the MEDA management system helped to 
improve the rhythm of aid disbursement. The creation of EuropeAid managerial units 
and the decentralisation process from the Commission’s delegations has certainly 
contributed to this success. Better information ﬂows and the improved bureaucratic 
awareness within Member-countries has also contributed to such improvements. 
However, EU interventions within the EMP context are often perceived by 
Mediterranean Partner countries as being subordinated to national European 
priorities. There is also a basic lack of political content in the activities of shared 
institutions, as well as a lack of speciﬁc mechanisms to encourage  Southern 
partners to present their own contributions to the Euromed Committee. From an 
institutional point of view, the structure of the EMP is clearly asymmetrical, since 
it brings together a union of 25 countries with a single voice over the Process 
on the one hand and, on the other, several individual states, each with its own 
agenda. The EMP is basically run by the Presidency of the EU, alongside the Senior 
Ofﬁcials amongst whom European representatives predominate. The follow-up of 
the Barcelona Process is ensured by European Commission teams in Brussels, who 
largely determine the shaping of Euro-Mediterranean priorities. To make matters 
worse, practically all EMP and EMP-related meetings take place in European states 
– which are either members of the Union or candidates for membership. Admittedly, 
the reason for this is that Arab states refuse to have meetings in Arab countries 
as long as there is no progress in the Middle East Peace Process. Nonetheless, in 
sum, therefore, the EMP has come to be seen as a process in which the Europeans 
develop initiatives and the Southern partners either accept or reject them.
However, in the past few years, the sense of appropriation of the Barcelona Process 
by Southern partners has become visibly stronger. This effectively counters a 
longstanding major criticism of the Partnership – the fact that Southern partners do 
not have a true sense of ‘ownership’ of the process. Furthermore, during last year, 
there has been a positive development which started with the Dutch Presidency 
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when the declarations of the Senior Ofﬁcials were prepared with the cooperation of 
Southern Partners. This is still, however, an embryonic initiative.
In 2004, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly met for the ﬁrst time. One 
of the positive features of this new institution is that – even after EU enlargement and 
the inclusion of the European Parliament – it has an equal representation of Southern 
and Northern members. The Parliamentary Assembly was expected to increase the 
visibility of the Partnership and to develop a counselling and monitoring function. 
However, without a more substantial permanent entity to provide support and 
expertise, the Assembly will not be able to monitor developments in the Partnership in 
any substantial way – nor is it clear that it is the appropriate body to do so. In addition, 
the idea that the EMPA would lead to greater visibility of the Partnership has failed to 
appear to date. Instead, the EMPA itself is hardly known to the wider world. 
Measuring Progress towards the 2015 Objective of
a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States
The Valencia Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs in April 
2002 introduced the instrument of Action Plans into the EMP. These were intended 
to be a means by which an operational impetus could be given to the Process. A 
number of measures included in the Valencia Action Plan have already been put 
into practice, including dialogue on defence issues, the support for sub-regional 
integration – the Agadir process – the regional programme on justice and home 
affairs, the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the dialogue of cultures; 
the extension to Southern Partners of the Tempus higher education programme 
and the creation of the Parliamentary Assembly. This shows that the approach 
inherent to the Action Plan adopted in Valencia is an effective tool; so much so 
that it has also been used for the Neighbourhood Policy. However, some of the 
Valencia recommendations have not been implemented (for example the possible 
restructuring of the Euromed Committee).
The future of the Barcelona Process depends largely on the ability of its members 
to deﬁne the reforms that will allow the resolution of existing blockages and that 
will strengthen the Partnership. This will involve the adoption of the principle of 
Partnership through ‘good practice’, which has developed over the last ten years 
and which has been identiﬁed in this Report. 
Fulﬁlling the Barcelona Declaration will require regular monitoring with clearer 
indicators and benchmarks, as well as a detailed annual review by the Euro-
Mediterranean ministerial conference. This will allow for an assessment of the 
evolution of mutually agreed goals that allow each country to advance towards 
the more complex objective of the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic 
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States. Clear indications of what Southern partners will gain by engaging in reforms 
– such as a stake in a single market based on all four freedoms, including the free 
movement of people – should be made clear. 
In sum, the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States project has to 
be based on the ‘ﬁxed dates’ model that made the Single Market and Currency 
possible in Europe. Hence, the 2010 FTA objective must be prioritised to ensure that 
the Euro-Mediterranean Community and Common Market are achieved by 2015.
‘Barcelona Plus’ should integrate the political and economic objectives of the 
Neighbourhood Policy into the EMP and make the ‘potential acquis’ of the Barcelona 
process more explicit. The Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States 
would be a common market of democratic states, in the sense that it would be 
open to countries willing to undertake such reforms. Barcelona Plus must be based 
on a clear inter-linkage between the different baskets of the EMP and on the need 
to guarantee the coherence between its ‘potential acquis’ and other economic, 
political, security or cultural activities. The basic outcomes cannot be just economic 
but must also include political issues.
Re-stating the Acquis
A clear identiﬁcation of the signiﬁcance and the dimensions of the Barcelona acquis is also 
required, in order to stress the fact that any state wishing to join the Partnership must accept 
the acquis. EuroMeSCo would like to suggest that the following terms would serve: 
‘Any State wishing to join the EMP must accept the following economic and political 
conditions, including the respect for the underlying principles of the Barcelona 
Declaration, particularly those mentioned in the Declaration of Principles (the ﬁrst 
part of the Barcelona Declaration); candidates must accept the principles of a market 
economy and respect the consequent multilateral obligations’. The following comment 
could be added to establish a link with the third basket of the Barcelona Process 
itself: Candidates must ‘promote social development, respect cultural diversity and 
support the active participation of civil society in the reform processes.’ As far as 
speciﬁcally political criteria are concerned, an essential clause could be added stating 
that candidates agree to ‘respect democratic principles and fundamental human 
rights’ as deﬁned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Reform of the EMP Institutions
There is a wide consensus around the idea that the decision-making mechanism 
of the EMP must be substantially restructured. Above all, reform of the current 
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institutional design must address the North/South asymmetry and thus devise ways 
to engage Southern partners actively in the administration of the Barcelona Process. 
A choice should also be ﬁnally made between intentional under-institutionalization of 
the Partnership, ensuring its reactivity and allowing its management with a remarkable 
economy of means, and the creation of new Euro-Mediterranean institutions, be 
they sectorial or with a transversal competence, in order to improve the visibility 
and credibility of the Barcelona Process. Such a dilemma should of course not be 
addressed at the expense of overall efﬁciency. Ameliorating the rules for existing 
institutions could then be a ﬁrst step in order to combine both requirements of 
simplicity and credit.
The co-ordination of the Partnership in a more equitable manner could be ensured 
through the creation of a co-presidency system. Such a system could be implemented 
through different scenarios, some of which are discussed below:
The adoption of a troika system, with the chair of the Ministerial Conferences 
jointly held by the Presidency of the EU, the co-ordinator of the Arab Group and 
Israel or Turkey on a rotating basis. This is clearly the scenario that would better ﬁt 
the present reality of the EMP.
The adoption of a co-presidency system, with a rotating presidency from the 
South decided by consensus. Ministerial conferences take place alternatively in the 
North and in the South in the country that holds the Presidency. This solution would 
obviously require major advances in the Middle East peace process.
The Presidency of the Foreign Affairs Ministerial Conference is held by 
the Presidency of the EU, while a Southern Partner is responsible, on a 
rotating basis, for the Presidency of sectoral conferences. The model of co-
presidencies in sectoral ministerial activities has already been positively tested in 
the past, namely during the Italian presidency, when Tunisia chaired the agricultural 
ministerial conference.
The election of a co-presidency from the South using the model of the Anna 
Lindh Foundation board of governors, that is, by a majority of 6/7 plus one. 
As far as the decision-taking powers of the Ministerial Conferences are concerned, 
two different options could avoid the blockages caused by the current rule of 
unanimity.
The adoption of the ‘consensus-minus-one’ principle (inspired by the CSCE 
voting system) whereby Partners can react against a state if the country in question 
has violated its obligations with regard to human rights, democracy and the rule-of-
law. In this way, a single dissenting vote could not prevent a decision.
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The establishment of a system of reinforced qualiﬁed majority voting, similar 
to that used in the EU’s Council of Ministers.
Furthermore, the deepening of the Barcelona Process and the progressive 
establishment of a Free Trade Area will require some kind of institutional structure that 
is recognised by all parties to be objective and impartial, while avoiding the creation 
of unnecessary bureaucratic complexity. From this point of view, the set up of a 
permanent secretariat of the EMP and later of the Euro-Mediterranean Community 
of Democratic States would not be a good solution, as it would represent an extra 
bureaucratic burden and would remove the Commission’s current ‘dual role’ of on the 
one hand representing the EU and on the other being the guarantor of the Barcelona 
Process for both sides. As an intermediate solution – and one already proposed in 
the past by EuroMeSCo – it would be appropriate to integrate Southern individuals 
into a ‘Pro-Med Unit’ working alongside the Commission and the Council on the 
EMP, especially in those services working on sectoral domains of the Partnership. 
Individuals from Southern partners could be taken on as temporary staff recruited 
directly by the EU institutions. In the longer run, some kind of formal secretariat 
could be envisaged, to deal with very speciﬁc issues, such as the dissemination 
of information on EMP initiatives. For the resolution of disputes concerning the 
Common Market, the best solution may be to create a panel structure, similar to the 
arbitration panels used by the World Trade Organisation. 
Finally, establishing institutional links between the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference would contribute 
to increase the former’s visibility and allow it to perform the counselling function 
originally envisaged for it. In any case, it is important to give the EMPA a substantial 
function and not to reduce it to a ‘talking shop.’ One possibility is for it to lead 
an initiative to strengthen parliamentary action among the partner-states through 
training, capacity building, and parliamentary exchanges.
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Annex
Detailed Assessment and Good Practices
in Selected Domains
Security and Defence Dialogue 
The aim of the political and security dialogue to create ‘a common area of peace and 
security’ was probably the one that raised most expectations when the Barcelona 
Process was launched. Here was a chance to break with the old paradigms of 
mistrust and power politics that have dominated North-South but mainly South-
South relations and develop a new scheme of regional cooperation. A general mood 
of optimism about the prospects for a resolution of the Middle East peace process 
contributed to a sense that this objective was indeed attainable. Furthermore, and 
seen from the EU’s perspective, the Barcelona Conference took place at a time that 
the EU was gradually asserting itself as a foreign policy actor and the list of objectives 
of the ﬁrst basket is a good example of this willingness to intervene directly in some 
of the major international issues.
Dialogue should have led both sides to converge on a common understanding of security. 
Whether it is possible to speak today, ten years after Barcelona, of a ‘common security 
culture’ is questionable, but given the values and principles of Barcelona, it is certainly 
possible to speak of a particular security culture that the Partnership, as a dynamic 
project, aims to promote. This security culture is closely linked to the comprehensive 
nature of the European integration process itself and its ‘security through inclusion’ 
approach. The Barcelona Declaration reﬂects this approach, by raising a large number 
of soft security issues to be dealt with in a North-South cooperation scheme. Further 
to the overall commitment of the second chapter to stimulate sustainable economic 
development, the third chapter of the Declaration is mostly devoted to developing 
a comprehensive policy approach by underscoring common concerns and possible 
common action on evolving ‘dialogue and respect between cultures and religions’; 
developing ‘human resources’ and promoting ‘cultural exchanges’; dealing with the 
varying aspects of legal migration; countering ‘illegal migration’; co-operating on 
preventing and ﬁghting terrorism; ﬁghting against ‘drug trafﬁcking, international crime 
and corruption’; co-operating against ‘racism, xenophobia and intolerance’.
Continuity of political dialogue within the institutions created by both the multi and the 
bilateral tracks, despite the various obstructions in the international and especially in 
the regional context, is an uncontested achievement. After Barcelona, foreign ministers 
of the EMP countries met in Malta, Palermo, Stuttgart, Marseilles, Brussels, Valencia, 
Crete, Naples, Dublin and The Hague. Parallel to the ministerial conferences, other 
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frequent meetings have taken place in the Euro-Mediterranean Committee and in the 
association councils at ambassadorial and experts’ level. The continuity of contacts 
through these various channels has created a sense of appropriation of the process 
by the partners and a unique framework for regional multilateral dialogue. Moreover, 
dialogue had the effect of promoting closer cooperation among Arab partners, with 
the creation and consolidation of the ﬁgure of co-ordinator of the Arab group. The 
permanence of dialogue structures, however, does not hide the fact that the EMP has 
not yet been able to forge a wide security dialogue, or even of having a consistent 
focus in relation to what it wants to achieve in this domain. A look at the different stages 
of political and security cooperation over the past ten years shows exactly that. 
Three main stages can be identiﬁed: The ﬁrst stage focused on the attempt at 
developing a Plan of Action essentially shaped by the CSCE experience of security 
cooperation and arms limitation. In this perspective the attempt at establishing 
conﬁdence-building measures (CBMs) in the so-called ‘hard-security’ domains 
of security and disarmament was considered a priority. This stage lasted for less 
than the ﬁrst semester of 1996. Very soon, it clearly emerged that devising and 
implementing conﬁdence-building measures, or even partnership-building measures 
as they were later to be termed, became an impossible task due to the stalemate 
in the Middle East peace process following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. 
Aside from the EuroMeSCo network and the training seminars organised by the 
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, the list of functioning conﬁdence-
building measures in the political-security arena is limited to the Egyptian-Italian 
initiative for cooperation for the prevention and management of natural and man-
made disasters. No major new initiatives have been launched in recent years. 
From the initial focus on CBMs, the Partnership’s focus shifted in early 1997 to 
‘partnership-building’, that is, on efforts towards a better understanding and 
deﬁnition of participating countries’ common ground before establishing any security 
cooperation. The search for common ground consisted basically on the works to 
establish a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability. After the brief experience 
with hard security, the talks on the Charter have been particularly disappointing 
and did not contribute signiﬁcantly to enhance conﬁdence among Partners. At the 
Marseilles ministerial conference in November 2000, when tensions in the Middle 
East were particularly high, the project of the Charter had already been set aside 
and dropped off the agenda, until better times. The failure of the Charter has clearly 
shown that, despite efforts to the contrary, progress in political and security dialogue 
is inextricably linked to developments in the Middle East.
However, discussions around the contents of the Charter were useful in the sense 
that they shed light on the different co-existing security cultures in the Euro-
Mediterranean region. Indeed, it uncovered a whole set of issues related with 
language and deﬁnitions, which reﬂect conceptual differences both within Europe, 
within the South and broadly speaking between Europe and the South.
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The third stage started with the 2002 Spanish Presidency of the European Union 
and the Valencia Action Plan, which has tried to put forward some concrete 
proposals in the security ﬁeld. This means that Partners have adopted a decidedly 
more pragmatic approach than that of the Charter. They are addressing speciﬁc 
sectors of cooperation rather than trying to identify the broad common ground on 
which cooperation should be built-up. The most important such sectors are anti-
terrorism cooperation, ESDP developments, civil protection and, ultimately, WMD 
and non-proliferation. There was also an attempt to link, whenever appropriate, 
ESDP dialogue with NATO’s own Mediterranean dialogue. 
The Valencia Action Plan has also paved the way for a Euro-Mediterranean dialogue 
on ESDP. This dialogue represents, ﬁrst and foremost, an attempt to ﬁll the lack of 
information on European security and defence issues that is notable in the South. In other 
words, there was an acknowledgement from the part of the EU that, on the one hand, 
a lack of information generates suspicion and, on the other, that it should do its utmost 
to counter the development of negative perceptions in the South vis-à-vis European 
defence initiatives, as had happened in the past with Eurofor and Euromarfor. Surveys on 
perceptions of ESDP in Southern Partners conducted by EuroMeSCo have shown that 
fears of European defence being essentially an instrument to deal with threats from the 
South have largely subsided and ESDP is actually regarded as a positive development 
on the whole. However, a positive and co-operative attitude from the South requires an 
effort of transparency from the part of the EU regarding its objectives and initiatives. 
Euro-Med ESDP dialogue represents also an attempt to break with the WEU 
Mediterranean Dialogue, which had very few tangible results to show for its eight 
years of existence (1992-2000), in spite of the fact that the security environment 
was not so fraught with tension as it is today. Its multi-bilateral nature, the uneven 
level of representation, the limited scope of issues discussed were partially to blame 
for the failure of WEU dialogue and constitute important lessons to ensure that 
the EU’s new framework of dialogue stays on the right course. It is still unclear, 
however, whether ESDP dialogue retains compatibility with the wider framework of 
the Barcelona Process and actually functions as an incentive to the revitalisation of 
the latter’s political and security dialogue. 
Good Practice
Despite the strong differences among partners in their approach to security and the 
few results from the point of view of joint actions, the EMP has developed a number 
of good practices while carrying out its political dialogue. These good practices are 
based on a coherent and open-ended process of shared conceptualisation which, by 
its purposes and modes, can be regarded as the emerging platform of partnership, 
giving shape to what can be called a Euro-Med common ground. Furthermore, 
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practices have been implemented in common by all EMP states and stem from 
within an institutionalised process of inclusion, consultation and dialogue.
Inclusion is essentially the involvement of countries in the same political process, so as 
to attenuate or dispel perceptions of unilateral behaviours and contribute to prevent 
potential conﬂicts. Despite modest political achievements with respect to expectations 
and the worsening of violent conﬂict between members, the EMP remains of signiﬁcant 
interest to the Southern as well as Northern members and continues to work. The 
sheer fact of being included in the process is of interest to all the Partners. 
The interest of the Partners is also stirred by the pervasive use of dialogue and 
consultation across all the stages of the process. While Ministers and Senior Ofﬁcials 
have more of a ‘legislative’ function, in the Euro-Med Committee Partners endorse 
and approve measures to be executed, such as the National and Regional Indicative 
Programmes for the Southern Partners. Furthermore, frequently and informally the 
Southern Partners meet with the EU Commission and national representatives to 
discuss and consult to prepare policies and documents to be submitted to the EMP 
machinery. Finally, a formal process of dialogue and consultation is allowed by the 
working of the bilateral Association Agreements’ institutions.
The pilot project of cooperation in the ﬁeld of civil protection should also be seen as a 
good practice, whose lessons can be of use for other areas. Because the majority of 
initiatives of the project were the responsibility of more than one partner, it reinforced 
the image of a common project that beneﬁts from the existence of a multilateral 
framework instead of just bilateral agreements. More importantly, civil protection 
cooperation has largely underlined the ‘pro-active’ approach that has lacked in 
the past 10 years of the Partnership; it shows that the Partnership can also mean 
running common projects to address common challenges, despite the persistence 
of disagreement (or even conﬂict) over larger political issues. The decision to launch 
a new stage of the project, building on the outcomes of the Pilot phase, shows that 
there is a basis for enhanced cooperation in areas that all Partners recognise has being 
of common interest. Recent tragic events in Southeast Asia have further revealed this 
communality. In what concerns dialogue on ESDP, the practice initiated by the EU 
Dutch Presidency of the second semester of 2004 of holding ad-hoc meetings of the 
Senior Ofﬁcials to discuss recent developments of the EU security and defence policy 
to include ESDP and non-proliferation issues in the agenda of the EMP political and 
security dialogue seems to dissipate fears that consultation and cooperation on ESDP 
would take place outside the framework of the Partnership. 
With these good practices, the EMP has at least partially succeeded in building 
partnership as a broad platform to generate PBMs. Good practices are not an 
equivalent of a successful political dialogue nor of a common ground and security 
cooperation. Still, by reinforcing partnership, they pave the way for making common 
ground, security cooperation and a fruitful political dialogue possible.
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Justice and Home Affairs
The Barcelona Declaration states that the development of the rule of law and 
democracy is essential to achieve the objectives of peace, stability and security in 
the Mediterranean region.  However, the Justice dimension (civil and criminal judicial 
cooperation) has remained peripheral in the Euro-Mediterranean process. Although 
placed under the third pillar of the partnership (‘Social, cultural and human affairs’), 
JHA issues have been approached mainly from a security (home affairs) point of 
view. The accent has been on cooperation to combat illegal migration, terrorism, 
drug trafﬁcking and organised crime – the latter three also included in the political 
and security dialogue.
At the bilateral level, all Association Agreements contain clauses deﬁning respect 
for democratic principles and fundamental human rights as ‘an essential element’ 
of the agreements. Although they also contain various JHA provisions (on money 
laundering, drug trafﬁcking, illegal immigration, ﬁght against terrorism and organised 
crime), only in two (Algeria and Lebanon) refer to the importance of institution building 
and the rule of law. The Association Agreements with Algeria refers to judicial civil 
and criminal cooperation (Article 85), whereas the Association Agreements with 
Lebanon refers to the importance of an ‘independent and effective judiciary and 
well trained legal profession’ (Article 59).
Up until the adoption of the regional JHA framework programme in Valencia in 
2002, several Euromed Ministerial Conferences underlined the need to strengthen 
cooperation towards the development of an area of justice, freedom and security. 
This was mainly due to the entry into force in the EU of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(May 1999) and the European Council of Tampere in October of the same year. 
These two events marked the beginning of the creation of a European ‘space of 
freedom, security and justice’, to forge common policies in the ﬁeld of migration, 
asylum, border control and police, civil and penal cooperation.
Following increased attention given to issues of Justice and Home Affairs, and 
triggered 11 September 2001, the MEDA II Regulation (2000) strategically re-
oriented this domain. While MEDA I included assistance ‘in order to reduce illegal 
migration, drug trafﬁcking and international crime’, the current programme added 
the new aim of ‘developing cooperation in areas relating to the rule of law, such 
as cooperation in judicial and criminal matters, the strengthening of institutions 
which guarantee the independence and effectiveness of the judicial system, the 
training of national security services and civil protection’. The 2000-2006 Euro-
med Partnership aims show the increased importance given to Justice and Home 
Affairs. The Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 establishes the ‘Enhancement of 
the rule of law, human rights and good governance’ as a renewed objective of the 
partnership and outlines various concrete JHA actions, based primarily on training 
programmes. A ‘twinning’ system (similar to the programme for the candidate 
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countries) in areas of cooperation that demand very high levels of expertise (e.g. 
crime-ﬁghting and crime prevention, border management, and judicial cooperation) 
is also envisaged.
11 September triggered a prompt reaction from both the EU member states and 
the Mediterranean partners. Not only did JHA matters gain new salience in the EU 
internal agenda but they impacted strongly in its relations with the Mediterranean, 
with cooperation in the ﬁght against terrorism gaining a new impetus. The 
‘Regional Cooperation Programme in the ﬁeld of justice, in combating drugs, 
organised crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues 
relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movement of people’ 
adopted in Valencia in 2002 was the political and normative response to this 
event. Because it differentiates between cooperation in the ﬁeld of justice, ﬁghting 
organised crime and terrorism on the one hand, and issues related to the social 
integration of migrants, migration and movement of people, on the other, the 
regional programme has the virtue of bringing together all JHA aspects under the 
third pillar, and thus ‘depoliticises’ some of its ‘hard security’ aspects (such as the 
ﬁght against terrorism). Even if this allows for a more ﬂexible and project-based 
implementation, the programme lacks ambition, particularly where the justice pillar 
is concerned. The aim of ‘creating a stable and transparent judicial environment’ 
is too limited an aim in light of the need for a structural reform of the judiciaries 
of the Southern countries based on an independent judicial branch, an essential 
feature of any democratic state. Thus, no explicit reference was made to the law 
enforcement training in respect for human rights, the absence of which has been 
denounced as a major problem where human rights in the Southern countries are 
concerned.  
More recently, there has been an effort to align the Regional JHA programme 
with the Neighbourhood Policy’s principles and objectives. According to the 
MEDA Regional Indicative Programme for 2005-2006, an important share of the 
funds of MEDA JHA II must be earmarked for actions with the partners that are 
best prepared to work in the priority areas: border control and management of 
migratory ﬂows, curbing the ﬁnancing of terrorism and money laundering, judiciary 
and legal reform related to fundamental aspects of justice (access to an impartial 
and independent justice) particularly in its effects on legal cooperation in civil and 
penal matters including in the ﬁeld of family and commercial law and criminal 
justice cooperation. All this must be viewed as part of the current will to reform 
the justice systems of several Mediterranean countries. The Neighbourhood 
Policy makes a clear allusion to the ‘strengthening of reforms, combining respect 
of human rights, the modernisation of Justice and of the police forces, and the 
respect of democratic principles’ for the ﬁrst time. The mainstreaming of human 
rights with police and justice reform has been for years now the central demand 
of NGO’s acting in the region.
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The Role of Civil Society
Over the last ten year some good practices in the ﬁeld of Justice and Home Affairs 
have been developed under the MEDA Democracy programme (now the European 
Initiative for Human Rights), for which one key priority was the rule of law (support 
for parliamentary activity, the judicial process – training for lawyers and judges, 
monitoring – governmental human rights institutions, institutional reform, training 
for security and armed forces as well as the civil administration and legal aid and 
advocacy to individuals). Taking into account its transversal nature, a JHA best 
practice assessment must also consider other EMP lines of action such as the 
development of civil society organisations, its human rights dimension or the actions 
aimed at modernising public administrations. 
Projects in this ﬁeld are very few and mostly led by European NGOs. A thorough 
assessment of JHA Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has yet to be undertaken, but it 
is clear that the small number of projects have had a micro-level impact. Such is the 
case of Penal Reform International (PRI), a British NGO that aims, inter alia, to reform 
the criminal justice systems (including specialised prison administrations). PRI has 
programmes in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan and these country-based 
approaches have been conducted within the framework of a regional approach. The 
Arab lawyers training project, led by the Law Society of England and Wales has also 
contributed to raise awareness of the need to modernise and make more ﬂexible 
the legal systems of eight Southeast Mediterranean Arab countries. 
Civil society in various Arab countries  is also committed to projects to improve justice 
systems, but the few existing good practices reﬂect the obstacles encountered 
in this domain. The Arab Centre for the Independence of the Judiciary and the 
Legal Profession (ACIJLP) is an Egyptian non-governmental institution that works to 
reinforce and support the status of justice in Arab countries, the independence of 
the judiciary, the legal profession and the respect of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
The regional dimension of JHA gained new impetus with the approval of the Regional 
framework programme. Conceived and launched in partnership with MEDA 
countries, it will run from 2003 to 2006. Its total (modest) budget of 6 million euro is 
equally distributed among the three pillars: police, justice, and migration. Although 
it is too early to assess its implementation, the establishment of a ‘Euro-Med Police 
Network’ bringing together police ofﬁcers from both sides of the Mediterranean 
specialising in several forms of crime, as well as a Euro-Mediterranean judicial 
training network can be seen as positive future prospects. The police cooperation 
programme, managed by CEPOL, held a ﬁrst meeting in March 2004 and 15 other 
seminars are already planned for the project on terrorism, organised crime, human 
trafﬁcking, drug trade, and ﬁnancial crime 
Barcelona Plus
60
Bilateral Cooperation
A global analysis show that many South Mediterranean countries are developing 
efforts to modernise their judicial systems, although reform is too often focused 
on upgrading judicial infrastructures rather than on substantial reform. In fact, the 
majority of JHA projects are not ‘internalised’ by the MEDA Partners, who prefer 
to avoid real reforms by concentrating project resources on equipment or, at best, 
training activities. As for police cooperation, progress is mainly declaratory, although 
the ﬁght against terrorism remains high on the EU agenda and there have been 
concrete developments in particular with Morocco after the Casablanca terrorist 
attacks in March 2003.
Although an assessment of individual Member States’ contributions to these 
projects remains to be undertaken, it is important to mention the speciﬁc case of 
France, which has promoted actions that have complemented MEDA Democracy 
projects, such as several programmes to train judges and public prosecutors. 
Given its historical links, the ‘École Nationale de la Magistrature’ has organised 
several important training programmes and fostered exchanges with magistrates 
from Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Egypt. Such initiatives ﬁt with the spirit of sub-
regional cooperation that the EMP aims to promote and could therefore be fruitfully 
shared with all partners.
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
The common strategy adopted by the EU towards the Mediterranean region 
in 2000 (2000/458/PESC, 19.06.2000) focuses on terrorism, both at the 
political and security dialogue and the Justice and Home affairs levels. The EU 
insists on the need to reinforce cooperation and commits itself to encouraging 
Mediterranean partners to adhere to UN international conventions on terrorism 
and to bind themselves to the rule that the fight against terrorism must be 
firmly anchored to the principles of international law and respect for human 
rights.
However, and despite an international context exerting continuous pressure in the 
Arab countries to align their legal systems with international law, in many instances 
the events of 11 September were a setback. Independent experts from United 
Nations and other organisations active in the ﬁeld of human rights have shown that 
under the pretext of ﬁghting terrorism, and based on a very wide interpretation of the 
term, most countries adopted measures and legislation that were used to repress 
internal political opposition, limit freedom of religion and expression, discriminate 
minorities, and to legitimate torture and deny the right to an equitable and fair trial, 
among other problems. 
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Progress in cooperation in the ﬁght against terrorism within the EMP can therefore 
only be observed at a declaratory level although even this has its value. At the 
Brussels EU-Med conference of 5-6 November 2001, ministers condemned any 
direct association between terrorism and the Muslim world. They committed 
themselves to accelerate the signature, ratiﬁcation and implementation of UN 
conventions in particular that of December 1999 on the repression of terrorism 
ﬁnancing, as well as to work together in all competent international fora to complete 
the global framework. An ad hoc group on terrorism of specialists from the two 
sides of the Mediterranean was also formed.
The 2002 Valencia Action Plan and the Regional Framework Programme demonstrate 
the commitment to engage in more concrete actions at a multilateral level. In 
Valencia, the ﬁght against terrorism was considered to be an ‘essential element of the 
political dialogue’ and the mandate of the ad hoc group was renewed. The regional 
programme thus consecrates the need for a coordinated and interdisciplinary 
approach with a view to preventing and penalising terrorist acts and the ‘exchange 
of experiences and the training of judicial, police and customs personnel and of units 
specialised in counter-terrorism’ has become a concrete objective to be achieved in 
2003-2006. At the bilateral level, an anti-terrorist clause was inserted in Association 
Agreements with Egypt, Algeria and Syria, and the signature of the Association 
Agreements with Lebanon in June 2002 was also accompanied by an exchange of 
letters on cooperation in the ﬁght against terrorism, although implementation is still 
pending. 
Terrorism remains one of the most controversial issues among EMP partners and 
is high on all ministerial council agendas. The absence of a common deﬁnition 
of terrorism is the source of most divergences, but the Middle East conﬂict and 
differences of views when evaluating the action of political parties and organisations 
such as Hamas and Hezbollah are the background against which the EMP must 
work to ﬁnd common interests. 
At the Euro-Mediterranean informal meeting of Crete (26-27 May 2003) the ministers 
reiterated their will to step up the ﬁght against terrorism in full respect of international 
law, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. They stressed that the 
ﬁght against terrorism should be a regular subject in the political dialogue between 
partners, but most importantly, they recalled that differences over the deﬁnition 
of terrorism should not prevent partners from identifying areas where they can 
cooperate. The Ministers underlined the importance of a regional answer to this 
challenge and welcomed the contribution of regional efforts to combat terrorism. 
The Naples Conference went further in declaring the countries commitment to ﬁght 
against terrorism ‘in all its forms and manifestations wherever and by whomsoever 
committed’.
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Migration 
Since the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in 1995, three main 
issues have inﬂuenced the EU approach to migration:
(1) in a context of globalisation, Europe has become a land of immigration. 
According to Eurostat Med, at the end of the 1990s 3.5% of the population in the 
European Union was immigrant (18 million people). Of this population, 5 million 
are from Mediterranean countries, of which 41% come from Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia, while 59% come from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. There are now 
more legal entrances every year in Western Europe than in the USA and Canada 
(1.400.000 against 850 000) and the diversiﬁcation of the forms of migration and of 
their countries of departure show that there is a ‘dream of Europe’ even if borders 
have been closed for salaried work since 1974. There are also more people who are 
seeking asylum in Europe than in America and Australia;
(2) European governments are acknowledging the ‘aging problem’ in Europe, and 
the lack of (both qualiﬁed and non-qualiﬁed) labour. This has had some impact in 
the context of ‘communitarisation’ of decision-making implemented after 1 May 
2004 and provided for by the European Constitution and The Hague Programme. 
At the national level, too, some European countries such as Germany, Luxembourg, 
Italy, Spain, Portugal and even France are changing their immigration policies, 
abandoning the ‘zero migration’ objective launched in 1993;
(3) EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe has prompted an internal debate on the 
implications of extending the free circulation of people to new member states. Although 
new members had to implement the ‘acquis communautaire’ in their immigration policies, 
accession to the EU caused serious concerns amongst some of the ‘old’ EU members, 
who fear the increase of illegal migration (most new members are transit countries) and 
the inability of newer members to effectively control the Union’s new external borders.
These three factors are the backdrop to the evolution of legislation at the EU level, 
which was partially responsible for important shifts in the immigration policies of 
individual EU member states. Progresses can be noted on the following domains:
(1) on antidiscrimination, following the article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the 
Chart of Fundamental Rights of 2000 and the European Constitutional Treaty; on 
the status of non EU long term residents and their families, following the approval of 
new EU legislation which allows for more inclusion and mobility;
(2) on access to citizenship in receiving countries, facilitated by countries where 
jus sanguinis rules prevail. Residence and birth have gained legitimacy for the 
recognition of citizenship and most immigration countries have dual nationals who 
are voters in the countries of settlement and sometimes also in the countries of 
origin. This may have a positive impact on the relations between both countries;
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(3) Multiculturalism and cultural dialogue are now recognised as central values 
in Europe, under pressure from the Council of Europe and are part of European 
Constitution. Multiculturalism is an integral part of initiatives implemented by local 
authorities in many European countries, a key for the harmonious integration of 
different groups.
Migration in the Euro-Mediterranean Context
Although the creation of a zone of shared prosperity, stability and peace in the 
Mediterranean basin is a central and explicit objective of the EMP, the Barcelona 
Declaration stated clearly that the process also aimed to limit migration from Southern 
partners to Europe. Looking back at the conclusions of the Euro-Med Ministerial 
conferences, this initial treatment of migration as a soft-security concern has shifted 
towards a new focus on Northern-Southern demographic complementarity to 
promote relations of solidarity and eliminate the perception of threat. Efforts to deal 
with migrations in the context of the Partnership have been scarce, namely in what 
concerns the link between the former and the implementation of the economic 
and socio-cultural baskets. On the one hand, free trade principles are disrespected 
because of the exclusion of labour circulation from the free trade area; on the other 
hand, the process of integrating migrant communities in European host countries 
has not been the object of enough attention. This shows that the EU has not been 
prepared to respond positively to proposals by Mediterranean partners for codifying 
migrant rights in Europe through a Migrants Charter, even though this is an implicit 
aspect of the cultural basket of the Barcelona Process. The reality is that, despite 
EMP aims to control migration, labour demand in Europe will, once again, lead to 
a renewed immigration, to fulﬁl labour needs usually met by South Mediterranean 
workers. 
Until the Feira common strategy, EU Mediterranean partners had repeatedly reiterated 
their commitment to strengthen cooperation especially in the ﬁght and readmission 
of illegal migration, but not much had been done in this regard. The Feira Strategy 
(2000) established the need for cooperation with the Mediterranean partners and 
to approach migration from a global perspective that takes on board social, cultural 
and economic realities, including combating poverty, improving living conditions 
and work opportunities, preventing conﬂicts, consolidating democracy and 
ensuring respect for human rights. There also acknowledged the need to establish 
a common policy to integrate nationals of member countries of the partnership with 
legal residence and long-term permits, to allow them to attain gradual equality of 
status with EU citizens. The Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of Marseilles 
of November 2000 constituted an important step forward, given the emphasis on 
intensifying dialogue, its preference for a balanced approach, and the exploration 
and strengthening of co-development and integration of legal residents in the EU. 
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The Valencia Action Plan, approved at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 
Foreign Affairs Ministers, held in Valencia in April 2002 proposed that a Ministerial 
Conference on Migrations and Social Integration should be held in the framework of 
the social and cultural partnership pillar. In the Regional JHA Framework programme 
approved three areas of cooperation in the ﬁeld of migrations:
(1) immigrant integration and the promotion of their status in the receiving countries 
and of their relations with the country of origin;
(2) strengthened dialogue and cooperation to manage migratory ﬂows and human 
movements, particularly where asylum is concerned, and;
(3) combating illegal immigration and the trafﬁc in persons. The Valencia Plan also 
seeks to promote bilateral agreements of admission of persons between countries 
of the EU and the Mediterranean, and between the partners and source countries 
(Sub-Saharan) for the repatriation of persons in irregular situations.
The Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Naples (2003) and Dublin (2004) stressed 
the need for a comprehensive approach on migrations although they emphasised 
combating illegal migration using readmission agreements to be agreed with the 
Partners most directly involved. Ten years after the foundation of the Partnership, 
tackling illegal migration across the Mediterranean sea is still considered of central 
importance. The Wider Europe report that the Commission submitted to the Council 
and Parliament in 2003 has signiﬁcantly shifted the focus of the EMP where migration 
is concerned. It recommended mechanisms to facilitate the trafﬁc of nationals 
from third countries from bordering areas, particularly those who participate in 
EU programmes or activities, as well as measures to strengthen the integration of 
residents from neighbouring countries living legally in the EU. Migration is part of the 
development chapter of the Neighbourhood Policy, and there is a commitment to 
the joint management of migration, based on differentiation and gradual principles. 
Thus, the Neighbourhood Policy reveals the emergence of new patterns of 
interdependence between EU countries and the Mediterranean partners. Migrations 
are now the core issue of all collaboration between North and South. However, 
border control and combating illegal immigration remain central security issues. 
In sum, there is a basic unresolved contradiction between the Neighbourhood 
Policy aim of establishing an area of free circulation, and the Barcelona Process, 
which promotes economic development with the objective of reducing migratory 
movements.
Good Practices and Trends
When the Barcelona dialogue was launched, most decision makers thought that 
development policies would stop migration ﬂows and there was an attempt to favour 
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the voluntary return of foreigners. These policies failed because many migrants had 
individual projects and did not aim to set up businesses on their return. Research 
studies (such as the OECD: Trends in International Migration and in Migration 
Policies, and the ILO International Labour Migration Programme), have highlighted 
the link between migrations and development. One consensus is that more socio-
economic development tends to reduce involuntary emigration although there is a 
gradually evolving consensus that emigration and development are not alternatives 
in the sense that development alone is insufﬁcient to curb migration ﬂows. In reality, 
short-term development does not stop migration: indeed, it may even lead to 
increased labour movement, due to the structural changes it brings to traditional 
societies. This understanding is fully reﬂected in the three main areas that have to 
be taken into account when analysing the role of immigrants as partnership actors: 
co-development, remittances and mobility.
Co-development and remittances have to be seen as instruments of cooperation 
with source countries, since migration can contribute to development more 
effectively if it makes use of the potential that different partners have to create 
and develop networks, which can only work well in the long term contract and 
in a context of economic and political stability in the country of origin. A concrete 
example is the project ‘Migration et Développement’, which started as an initiative of 
Moroccan immigrants in France, and aims to connect immigration and cooperation 
to development. With it, civil society associations are directly responsible for the 
management of immigrants’ savings and remittances are used for decentralised 
development projects in the countries of origin. Such projects not only promote 
local development but also facilitate contacts between immigrant communities 
and the societies from where they came. Such initiatives are dissociated from 
return policies and are forms of decentralised cooperation (MEDA), which do not 
necessarily involve states.
As regards mobility, there are now various initiatives in which migrations is viewed as 
a partial answer to both surplus labour supply in sending countries and aging and a 
shrinking domestic work forces in Europe. That is the case of ‘General Agreement 
on Trade in Services’, Module 4 which mentions the right of employers to post their 
workers abroad. International companies are used to sending ‘expatriate staff’ or 
senior managerial or technical expertise to foreign countries and they want clear 
rules and protection. The EU Interreg programme has a ‘Project Magreb’ (Interreg 
III-B MEDOCC), led by the Trade Promotion Consortium of the Trade and Tourism 
Ministry of the Government of Catalonia, which allows young professionals from the 
Maghrib countries to gain business management skills in Barcelona and to facilitate 
the recruitment of highly skilled Maghribian professionals in European companies 
established in their country.
The gradual awareness that tighter border control policies are not a solution for 
migration (progressive abandonment of zero immigration policies) has led to (bilateral) 
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labour force agreements between EuroMed partners (though limited to skilled labour 
force) and the implementation of quota immigration policies. Recent diversiﬁcation 
of visas, showing a more positive immigration policy towards the South, is also 
observable: students have been granted visas for salaried work in some European 
countries (such as France) when they ﬁnd a stable job after the end of their studies. 
Some countries like Germany have granted green cards to highly specialised workers 
(computers, engineering), while others have concluded bilateral agreements or work 
quotas for agriculture, services, and tourism. These half opened doors have been 
given in exchange of a better border control by Southern Mediterranean countries, 
leading to the externalisation of European borders. This has implications for human 
rights (the wall of Ceuta, the immigration door concluded between Italy and Libya is 
a case in point). A positive immigration policy should create more trust in the Euro-
Mediterranean dialogue (calls for visas are constant among youths when an ofﬁcial 
visit by a European guest occurs), to ﬁght illegal migration and avoid a dangerous 
mix between asylum seekers and economic migrants. But conditionality cannot 
ignore human rights.
The brain drain issue, which is debated in the Southern Mediterranean as a problem 
of unequal exchange, has evolved positively. The idea that mobility does not mean 
long-term or permanent migration and may have positive impacts on countries of 
origin, which train more elites that they can employ, is becoming more widespread, 
together with the idea that more mobility will bring less deﬁnitive settlement. Some 
European policies focus on qualiﬁed migration with some diversiﬁcation of visas 
(multiple entrances, long and short term jobs). It may bring more circulation of 
people and ideas, even if it does not deal with unqualiﬁed labour, whose mobility is 
ensured essentially by illegal networks.
Not to be forgotten is the growing concern with transit migration, especially in the 
Southern countries of the Mediterranean that have become an intermediate transit 
points. There are growing immigration pressures in many members of the Partnership 
both in the Western Mediterranean and the Middle East, which are transit areas 
for ﬂows from Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa. To deal with the issue a Dialogue on 
Mediterranean Transit Migration was launched. The States involved in the MTM are 
on the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia, and EU Member States, Norway, Switzerland 
and Turkey on the Northern shores. The dialogue also involves the League of Arab 
States, UNHCR and the European Commission as observer. Ofﬁcials from Ministries 
of Home Affairs, Intelligence and Security Services, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Development Agencies participate in this open dialogue
Over the past decade, nationality legislation in various EU Member States has also 
changed, shifting from jus sanguinis to jus solis double nationality (like Germany). 
This has prompted new thinking about immigrant communities and the role they 
can play in relations with their countries of origin. The absence of and, sometimes, 
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inaccuracy of existing information on migration from the South of the Mediterranean 
has been acknowledged in the last years. Several instances of good practice have 
developed in an attempt to establish a comprehensive framework of information 
on migration trends based on the need to learn more about migration at the 
regional level, namely through the 5+5 dialogue platform or the Euro-Mediterranean 
Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration.
The good practices identiﬁed above show that migration is becoming a central 
aspect of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and that there has been a shift from 
a security-based view to a more positive approach based on the concepts of co-
development, co-responsibility and trans-nationalism. State policies are still mainly 
focused on closing borders, which resulted in the rise of illegal emigration and in a 
crisis of asylum rights (the idea that asylum seekers are in fact illegal migrants using 
asylum channels to enter the EU has led to a restriction of asylum policies, despite 
existing international instruments that state the right to asylum as a fundamental 
human right). The tendency of EU member states to limit labour agreements to 
skilled labour forces is a highly selective immigration policy, and disregards the fact 
that European countries also need non-skilled workers and that they are unable to 
counter the existence of a parallel illegal economic sector. Finally, the security based 
discourse ﬁnds an echo among political extremists in Europe and even in mainstream 
parties, which have proposed the creation of migrant camps in Northern Africa and 
the Middle East, for example.
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Democracy and Human Rights
Democracy
Despite the lack of signiﬁcant changes in the political situation of most Southern 
Mediterranean countries during the last decade, a discourse on democratic 
transition and reform has emerged in the region. This discourse was on the one 
hand prompted by a growing awareness of the populations at large that post-
independence political regimes were no longer capable of providing answers to 
society’s changes and, on the other, by the failure of economic programmes that led 
to questioning of governance in Northern Africa and the Middle East. With varying 
degrees of impact, it was the Islamist political parties that emerged in the late 80’s 
and early 90’s as the champions of this social unrest. 
However, these failed political and economic models and the societal reactions 
that their failure triggered have found little criticism from the part of the EU in the 
framework of the EMP. The main objective of creating an area of peace and stability 
based on the respect for human rights and democracy was understood and put 
in practice in a narrow sense, making a very clear separation between initiatives 
aimed at civil society and dialogue at the intergovernmental level. The agenda of 
the latter pushed aside a serious discussion on the need for real transformations 
of governance models, in the interest of political pragmatism, while hoping that 
economic liberalisation would bring about social changes and, concomitantly, political 
liberalisation. As stated elsewhere in this report, this paradigm has not produced the 
expected results: societies in the Mediterranean and Middle East have witnessed a 
modest rise of their quality of living as a result of economic growth. Their aspirations 
for democracy and rule of law failed to materialise.
Part of the failure of the EMP to deal effectively with the issue of political reform was due 
to the refusal of bringing into the debate the issue of Islamist parties’ participation in the 
process of democratisation. Political Islam has an enormous spread of views which have 
been thoroughly analysed in many studies on the issue. For the sake of this assessment 
it is more important to make a basic differentiation between extremist groups resorting 
to the use of violence and reformist movements/parties. The former have captured 
media attention due to their rejection of democracy and their confrontational stance. 
Reformist Islamists, on the contrary, are very much linked to the political and social 
situation of Arab societies. Such concerns are clearly distanced from any ‘ahistorical’ 
interpretation of Islam. Their main concern is to devise autonomous references that 
could serve as the basis for their political projects. In this sense Islamist parties are 
usually critical of the Western cultural universe, not because all of them refuse progress 
and development, as well as the liberties, but because of the arrogance or double-
standard with which such universe is sometimes portrayed and promoted. In other 
words, they claim the right to undergo political and social reform based on local or 
traditional values, refusing a ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’ approach to democracy. 
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Furthermore, over the past 10 years, there is an increasing number of Islamist parties 
that have shown their acceptance of the basic democratic principles, namely political 
pluralism and the sharing of power, through their participation in state institutions. 
Such participation requires, however a degree of political openness from the state. 
There is thus a clear link that must be made between the exclusion of such parties 
from the political game and the lack of political reforms. Political Islam and the 
religious renaissance in the South were perceived by most EU Member states and 
governmental elites in the South – themselves a product of secular Arab nationalist 
movements – as a unique threat to stability. The Algerian crisis at the end of 1991 
consolidated this view. The 11 September terrorist attacks and the subsequent ‘war 
on terror’ provided that view with a renewed legitimacy. 
In part due to the fear of uncontrolled instability that the opening of the political 
game to Islamic groups could provoke, engagement with such organisations, in 
the context of the EMP, has been only tentative. Islamist-dominated professional 
syndicates have not received backing. Dialogue forums set up to explore inter-
religious commonalities have invariably excluded any notable Islamist representation. 
All this reinforces Arab views that the European conception of democracy is rigidly 
secular and allows for little expression of strongly held religious identities.
Recently, however, a new attitude towards political Islam is emerging in the region. 
There is a stronger perception in most South Mediterranean countries that these 
movements are a growing and inescapable reality leading to a more positive view 
that peaceful movements must be involved in the process of reform . This shift of 
attitude in some Southern countries has also contributed to changing the way that 
such movements are perceived in Europe.
Human Rights
The Regional Level. It cannot be said that the EMP has done much to improve the 
human rights situation in the region or that human rights principles are coherently and 
consistently applied in regional cooperation. Except for the case of Turkey – where 
reform has been essentially the outcome of the EU pre-accession strategy – the few 
noticeable improvements of the past decade have been internally induced, and the 
EMP has had only a small role to play in them. The Presidency conclusions of the 
Ministerial meetings since 1995 clearly show that human rights were sidelined from 
high level discussions until 11 September 2001, and it was only after the attacks 
that human rights became more prominent (the Valencia Conclusions and Action 
Plan and the Commission Communication on Reinvigorating Human Rights and 
Democratisation in the Mediterranean Region exemplify this). Nonetheless, regional 
references to human rights remain declaratory, and statements of Partner’s binding 
obligations to respect international human rights standards are carefully sidestepped. 
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In fact, both North and South have limited basic rights and even violated civil liberties 
since 11 September, despite the fact that human rights are systematically referred 
to in EMP documents on anti-terrorist measures.
A survey of the activities undertaken within the framework of the Barcelona chapters 
illustrates these points. There are no activities in the ﬁrst chapter barring declaratory 
politics. High Ofﬁcials have occasionally exchanged information on international 
human rights conventions signed or ratiﬁed by their countries, and a series of 
– albeit short – presentations on justiﬁcations for reservations to such treaties 
by some partners have been made. Further, high ofﬁcials invited representatives 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network to give a presentation at one 
meeting, and approved the inclusion of human rights sessions in training courses 
for young diplomats, which are held in Malta. Despite MEDA regulations (Articles 3 
and 11 highlight respect for human rights and democracy as an essential element 
of cooperation), the second economic and ﬁnancial chapter makes no provision for 
systematic procedures to evaluate human rights conditions, be it in the programming, 
implementation or evaluation phase. The only more or less explicit reference to human 
rights in the second chapter is the recognition of the key role that women play in 
development, and the commitment to promote their active participation in economic 
and social life and in the creation of employment. However, although there were two 
conferences on the issue during the Portuguese and Belgium presidencies, only 
a small programme materialised. The third chapter has promoted more concrete 
initiatives. The civil forums held since the 1999 Stuttgart Civil Forum have put human 
rights on the top of the agenda. Various Wilton Park Conferences, which were co-
funded by MEDA, also brought together human rights activists, government ofﬁcials 
and experts to debate rights issues. Further initiatives are the MEDA-sponsored 
seminar of May 2001 on Access to Justice in the Euro-Mediterranean region, and 
the 1998 civil society meeting on migrant and refugee rights, held under the Dutch 
Presidency, which was reported back to a High Level meeting. These meetings 
have been important as ‘ice breakers’ between people that rarely meet. Human 
rights have also been a main concern of the Euro-Med Youth Platform and the newly 
established Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue of Cultures. 
However, none of the conclusions of third chapter meetings have been taken on 
board at the ofﬁcial level and there is no programme that can be identiﬁed as a 
human rights-focused project. Only programmes and activities outside the direct 
remit of the EMP include initiatives clearly related to human rights.
There are three documents on the regional dimension of the Barcelona Process that 
illustrate a tendency to make more explicit reference to human rights over the last 
decade, albeit at a non-binding level: the 2002 Regional Programme for cooperation 
in the ﬁeld of justice, combating against drugs, organised crime and terrorism and 
cooperation on the social integration of migrants, migration and the movement 
of people; the Regional Indicative Programme for 2004-2006, and the already 
mentioned Commission Communication on Reinvigorating European Actions on 
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Human Rights and Democratisation with Mediterranean Partners. While the ﬁrst 
two explicitly refer to human rights, democracy, the rule of law, good governance 
and judicial independence, they do not identify any particular budget line to sustain 
activities linking these different areas. The Commission Communication proposes 
10 highly operational actions to promote human rights and human rights dialogue in 
the region, but these were ‘overruled’ by the new Neighbourhood Policy and Action 
Plans, and seem to have lost momentum and support.
The Bilateral Level. The verdict on bilateral cooperation is equally dim where 
improving human rights conditions is concerned, but human rights protection is 
becoming increasingly prominent in this domain. The human rights ‘clause’ in bilateral 
association agreements are legally binding, and with all such agreements entering 
into force, a more structured and coherent political dialogues on human rights have 
taken place at association council and committee meetings, although the debate 
suffers from EU countries tending towards the lowest common denominator when 
deciding who to criticise, and how harsh the criticism. MEDA does fund country 
strategies and national indicative programmes that deal with human rights and 
human rights projects, albeit still timidly, but as such programmes are not evaluated, 
it has not been possible to assess their impact.
The Neighbourhood Policy country strategies and action plans constitute the most 
important development at this level. An analysis of the country reports for the ﬁve 
EMP countries (Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia) demonstrates 
that they offer a largely accurate picture of the key problems in each state. The fact 
that EU reports are occasionally quite critical of all ﬁve countries (when compared 
to previous Country Strategy Papers before their overhaul) testiﬁes to how the EU 
has come a long way in its willingness to make more honest appraisals. Generally 
speaking, the Action Plans related closely to many of the priority issues identiﬁed in 
the country reports, and show some improvement compared to the former National 
Indicative Programmes in the amount of attention paid to human rights and the 
reference to fulﬁlling treaty obligations (albeit not universal) and the use of associated 
monitoring mechanisms to measure progress. The proposal to establish sub-
committees on Human Rights for Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia is also noteworthy. 
Beyond this, however, there prevails a narrow concept of rights. Country reports 
focus overwhelmingly on civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural 
rights are given short shrift (human rights are not discussed at all under the economic 
and social issues section) despite the potentially negative impact of structural 
adjustment and market reform policies on these rights. Development, education 
and poverty are also not connected with rights enshrined in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other relevant treaties that 
are binding on partner countries. Nor do human rights ﬁgure to any great extent 
in Justice and Home Affairs despite the obvious deterioration in a range of civil 
liberties. Furthermore, no mention is made of the benchmarks and indicators to be 
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used, or of implementation schedules. There is an excessive focus on dialogue or 
‘exploring possibilities’ without concrete timelines or outputs as envisaged in earlier 
Communications. It is not clear why some activities are short- or medium-term, 
when programmes are supposed to end, and whether one should follow the other 
or work in parallel. Finally, consultation with civil society representatives is almost 
absent in the process of drafting, implementing and evaluating plans.
Other EMP-Related Actions. The most visible and successful approaches 
to human rights promotion are those promoted by the European Initiative for 
Democratisation and Human Rights (EIDHR) – the MEDA Democracy Programme 
was originally established by a European Parliament request for the promotion 
of independent civil society and human rights work in the region. The EIDHR 
has funded numerous local human rights NGOs and programmes and important 
regional bottom-up initiatives have emerged, such as the Euro-Mediterranean 
Human Rights Network, the regional programmes of the International Federation 
for Human Rights (FIDH), the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the Arab 
Institute for Human Rights, Penal Reform International, among others. These have 
provided real opportunities – often with the support of the European Parliament – for 
intercultural exchange, capacity building and policy making, indeed to the extent 
that human rights NGOs in the region are among the most articulate and proactive 
defenders of regional cooperation. This success has been greatly hampered by legal 
and practical constraints on human rights work in most Southern Mediterranean 
countries, however, and by regular malfunctions and restructurings of the EIDHR, 
including discontinued funding for some of the most successful initiatives. The EMP 
has beneﬁted very little from these initiatives, as there is no regular dialogue between 
human rights groups and Partnership ofﬁcials, except of an informal nature.
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Civil Society
There have been many EMP initiatives in the ﬁelds of civil society dialogue and 
cooperation, political participation and human rights developed over the last 10 
years. The assessment of these programmes on actual social and political changes 
is unfortunately very incipient. It is difﬁcult to attribute change to speciﬁc interventions, 
as reforms are inﬂuenced by multiple factors. In addition, the impact is only often felt 
over the long term and can occur long after projects have ended. At the macro-level, 
EMP programmes do not appear to have had a signiﬁcant impact on civil society 
dialogue, bringing the partnership close to the people and on promoting human 
rights and democratic development. Political, economic and social gaps persist 
between and within Euro-Med societies, and between governments and societies. 
These gaps widened after 11 September 2001 and the Iraq war. However, there 
are also positive developments. Regional civil society initiatives created important 
new channels of cooperation and exchange. In Morocco, to explore another 
example, some family law provisions were changed, a move that pro-reform civil 
society actors supported in the framework of the EMP. While the actual impact of 
the reform remains to be seen, it certainly counts among the positive impacts of 
EMP cooperation.
The EMP introduced various instruments to encourage exchange and cultural 
cooperation between the partner countries. Regional exchange programmes 
include EuroMed Audiovisual, EuroMed Youth, EuroMed Heritage and more recently, 
TEMPUS, a university exchange programme. All have contributed to increasing 
contacts and building networks. Such contacts are especially important at a time 
when the clash of civilizations discourse is so prominent. However, these networks 
have been restricted to very limited segments of societies, such as heritage workers, 
ﬁlmmakers who want to consume non-Hollywood fare, and top university students 
or teachers. Networks established in the ﬁrst and second basket of the EMP, such 
as EuroMeSCo and FEMISE have played an important role in conﬁdence building, 
but are also limited to elite circles. Euro-Med Youth has a broader reach and has 
allowed for exchanges beyond the narrowly deﬁned realm of culture, thus potentially 
involving larger segments of society, although its budget has been smaller than that 
of other Euro-Med programmes.
Networks and joint initiatives in the ﬁelds of human rights and development were also 
launched over the past 10 years. The EuroMed Human Rights Network (EMHRN) 
is one example. It has grown as a bottom-up initiative of human rights activists and 
developed into a very effective and visible EuroMed network developing joint initiatives. 
EuroMed civil forums have been held in parallel to the EuroMed foreign minister 
meetings since the beginning of the Barcelona process and have given an important 
impetus to civil society networking and exchange. The forums have gathered a wide 
array of civil society actors from all EMP countries ranging from trade unionists and 
academics to environmental groups, cultural bodies and human rights associations. 
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Critics of the civil forums have noted the lack of representation, their being limited to 
small circles of activists, their lack of continuity, and the lack of consistent participation 
of civil society actors in EMP decision-making beyond the fora.
One of the most recent initiatives encouraging Euro-Mediterranean intercultural 
exchange is the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of 
Cultures, to be based in Alexandria. The creation of the Foundation was agreed in 
Valencia in 2002 in reaction to the perceived cultural polarization after 11 September. 
It is due to be launched later this year. It is remarkable that the Foundation will have 
its seat in Egypt – a Southern Mediterranean rather than in a European partner 
country. Moreover, all EMP partner countries have agreed to support it ﬁnancially, 
thus making it a common project rather than a solely European one. The Foundation 
is also meant to encourage cooperation between already existing networks and 
organis ations in the Euro-Mediterranean area, so it can play a potentially important 
role in the ﬁeld of exchange.
Various EMP tools have been used to support civil society initiatives in the ﬁelds of 
development, human rights and democracy. The MEDA Democracy Programme 
is worth mentioning. It has given civil society initiatives for human rights and 
democracy in all Southern Partners access to funding, whereas other budget lines 
have a geographically limited outreach. Some National Indicative Programmes 
(NIPs) include also ﬁnancial allocations to civil society.
To assess the impact of these programmes is a difﬁcult task, particularly as impact 
assessment is not mainstreamed in the follow up of programmes. On a micro-
level some impacts can be observed. The acquisition of ofﬁce spaces for human 
rights organisations has been highly important to ensure continuity of their work 
in unfavourable environments, for example. Trade unions trained by EU-funded 
training centres have become particularly active in advocating the rights of their 
members. Macro-level impacts are hard to control and may occur years after the 
actual intervention.
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Table 1.
Human Development
across the EMP Region
Source: Human Development Report 1997, 2004, 
World Bank.
2 The human development index (HDI) focuses on three 
measurable dimensions of human development: living 
a long and healthy life, being educated and having a 
decent standard of living. Thus it combines measures of 
life expectancy, school enrolment, literacy and income 
to allow a broader view of a countrys’ development than 
does income alone.
3 Human Development Classiﬁcation: all countries 
included in the HDI are classiﬁed into three clusters by 
achievement in human development: 1) High Human 
Development (with an HDI of 0,800 or above); 2) 
Medium Human Development (0,500 - 0,799); 3) Low 
Human Development (less than 0,500).
4 This average does not include Algeria and the 
Palestinian Authority since they have no data from 
1995.
5 Average from 1995 both from the EU at 25 or plus 
Turkey does not include Slovakia since no data is 
available from it in that period.
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Table 2.
Six Dimensions
of Governance
MAC – Mediterranean Arab Countries: Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.
This table was drawn from Azzam Mahjoub’s 
contribution to the report, Les implications politico-
institutionnelles du volet économique du Partenariat 
Euro–Méditerranéen. 
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Contributions to the report dealt speciﬁcally with the following topics:
Roberto Aliboni, Barcelona Plus Ten: the political and security dimension
Catherine Wihtol De Wenden, Barcelona Plus: the issue of migration
Bettina Huber, Civil Society dialogue and cooperation, human rights, good 
governance and political participation – good practices, future challenges
Emily Landau, Assessing 10 years of the EMP: conceptions of the Barcelona 
Process
Erwan Lannon, Mettre en lumière l’acquis de Barcelone; La cohérence entre le 
PEM et les nouvelles initiatives européennes
Azzam Mahjoub, Les implications politico-institutionnelles du volet économique du 
partenariat euro-méditerranéen
Luis Martinez, How to develop Barcelona Initiatives with relevance to political and 
security issues
Gema Martín Muñoz, Overcoming the cultural perceptions divide; Political 
Participation
Noémia Pizarro, 10 year Euromed partnership: a JHA assessment
Mark Schade Poulsen, Human Rights in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
Mohamed Kadry Said, Practical examples of political and security cooperation
Gamal Soltan, The impact of regional crises and international changes on the 
Barcelona Process
Non-written contributions were made by those participating in the Paris meeting 
in January 2005 at the IFRI, namely:
Elise Aghazarian, PASSIA, East Jerusalem; Roberto Aliboni, IAI, Rome; Muriel 
Asseburg, SWP, Berlin; Denis Bauchard, IFRI, Paris; Pedro Courela, IEEI, Lisbon; 
Kamel Jendoubi, IFRI, Paris; Erwan Lannon, University of Ghent; Pierre Lepetit, 
IFRI, Paris; Azzam Mahjoub, University of Tunis; Gema Martín-Muñoz, Universidad 
Autónoma de Madrid; Luis Martinez, CERI, Paris; Abdallah Saaf, CERSS, Rabat; 
Dorothée Schmid, IFRI, Paris; Álvaro de Vasconcelos, IEEI, Lisbon; Maria do Rosário 
de Moraes Vaz, IEEI, Lisbon.
Contributions
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ACIJLP Arab Centre for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession
ALU Arab Lawyers’ Union
CEPOL European Police College
CBM Conﬁdence Building Measure
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSCM Conference on Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean
EEA European Economic Area
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EIDHR European Initiative for Democratisation and Human Rights
EMHRN EuroMed Human Rights Network
EMPA Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly
EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
FEMISE Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes
FIDH International Federation for Human Rights
FTA Free Trade Area
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
ILO International Labour Organisation
MAC Mediterranean Arab Countries
Mercosur Southern Common Market
MPC Mediterranean Partner Country
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NIP National Indicative Programme
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PBM Partnership-building Measure
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation
PNA Palestinian National Authority
PRI Penal Reform International
Acronyms
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UMA Union du Maghreb Arabe / Arab Maghrib Union
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
WEU Western European Union
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
